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[101] 
PAUL F. KIRGIS* 
The Contractarian Model of 
Arbitration and Its Implications for 
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards 
In an article that appeared as alternative dispute resolution, or 
ADR, was emerging as a topic of mainstream legal consideration, 
Paul Carrington addressed the different understandings of the 
“alternative” in ADR.1  He postulated that proponents of ADR unite 
under the banners of three primary aversions.  First, some proponents 
seek an alternative to law itself.2  They resist the formalism and 
rigidity of legal solutions to personal and social problems.  Second, 
some proponents seek an alternative to professionalism in law.3  They 
dislike the adversarialism that attorneys seem to bring to dispute 
resolution.  Third, some proponents seek alternatives to traditional 
adjudicative procedures.4  They distrust a judicial system that they see 
as inefficient and callous to the real needs of participants. 
Within the spectrum of ADR techniques, arbitration seems largely 
a response to the third concern.  The disputants who favor arbitration 
are not necessarily averse to law and legal solutions, and they 
typically embrace lawyers as dispute resolution professionals.  What 
they often want to avoid is the formality of traditional adjudicative 
process.  In particular, they usually want a process made less 
 
 * Professor, St. John’s University School of Law.  I am grateful to Chris Borgen, Elaine 
Chiu, Michael Perino, Susan Stabile, Brian Tamanaha, Stephen Ware, and Tim Zick for 
their helpful comments on this project, and to Dora Jimenez for her invaluable research 
assistance. 
1 See Paul D. Carrington, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 298 (1984). 
2 Id. at 298. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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expensive through decreased use of pleadings, discovery, and 
motions, and they want a decision made by a professional with 
expertise in a field rather than by a lay jury.5 
However, arbitration also carries the potential to respond to the 
first concern:  the concern regarding the use of law to resolve 
disputes.  According to one conventional way of thinking about the 
law, it is primarily a set of rules supplying norms of behavior.6  Those 
rules may be more or less determinate, and they may derive from any 
of a number of sources.  But there seems to be broad consensus, at 
least among the public, that legal rules exist, that they constitute “the 
law,” and that the job of legal actors is to consistently and fairly apply 
those rules. 
Sometimes disputants want to avoid the rules that a court would be 
likely to apply to their dispute.  For example, trading partners in a 
commercial relationship may want their dispute resolved by reference 
to industry custom rather than generally applicable rules of law.7  If 
they went to court, they could not be assured that the rules of their 
choice would be applied.  By choosing arbitration, they can pick an 
arbiter who is more likely to apply those rules.8  To the extent the 
parties empower the arbitrator to decide their dispute without 
reference to the legal rules that a court would be likely to invoke, they 
make arbitration an alternative to law. 
That scenario assumes that the parties have roughly equal 
bargaining power and are in a relationship that they expect to 
continue.  The use of arbitration to avoid legal rules seems benign in 
 
5 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of 
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2243-47 (1993). 
Disputants may also value arbitration for its promise of confidentiality.  Id. at 2240. 
6 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVE 1 (1975). 
7 See Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the 
Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 124 (1997). 
8 See EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE  
RESOLUTION:  THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 324 (2d ed. 2001) (“The theory of the 
contracts to arbitrate New York textile disputes was simple—rather than go to court, let a 
trusted, expert third party who was knowledgeable in the trade and industry customs 
decide the dispute. Arbitrator expertise was primarily responsible for the success of these 
textile arbitrations . . . .”); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 127 (1992) 
(stating that arbitrators decide complex cases in the diamond industry primarily “on the 
basis of trade custom and usage”); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 
COLUM. L. REV. 846, 852-53 (1961) (explaining that the arbitrator’s awareness of trade 
custom is a factor that enhances the predictability of arbitration). 
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that situation.  In other contexts, however, parties may seek to avoid 
law in ways designed to advantage them or disadvantage their 
contract partners.  For example, many financial institutions would 
prefer to be free of legal restrictions in their dealings with customers, 
many employers would prefer to be free of discrimination laws, and 
many doctors and hospitals would prefer to be free of medical 
malpractice liability.  These parties might jump at the chance to avoid 
otherwise-governing legal rules by using arbitration instead of formal 
adjudication.  They might choose arbitration in the hope that an 
industry-sensitive arbitrator will ignore or downplay otherwise 
applicable legal rules favoring the weaker party.  The prospect of 
arbitration as a means to avoid law in these situations seems far less 
palatable. 
Arbitration has become increasingly common in cases involving 
precisely those circumstances.  At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, arbitration was not widely used outside of commercial 
disputes involving merchants. 9  For a variety of reasons, not least the 
rising cost of litigation, the use of arbitration expanded rapidly in the 
second half of the last century.10  The United States Supreme Court 
validated the use of binding contractual arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism in many situations in which the parties have 
neither equal bargaining power nor an ongoing relationship.11  As a 
result, arbitration became widespread in consumer disputes, 
employer–employee relations, and virtually every other context in 
 
9 See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION:  ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 6 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach 
to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1380 (1991) (“The United States Arbitration Act . . 
. was written with the implicit assumption that it would be invoked by commercial actors 
having relatively equal bargaining power and emotive appeal to a jury.”); Zeb-Michael 
Curtin, Note, Rethinking Prima Paint Separability in Today’s Changed Arbitration 
Regime: The Case for Inseparability and Judicial Decisionmaking in the Context of 
Mental Incapacity Defenses, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 1910-13 (2005) (explaining that 
arbitration was limited to use among commercial actors at the time of the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s (FAA) passage). 
10 See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves:  How the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 167 
n.11 (2003) (citing a report by the American Arbitration Association that “[f]rom 1990 to 
2002, the AAA’s caseload increased 379 percent”). 
11 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (allowing 
arbitration for an employer–employee relationship); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (allowing arbitration for an 
investor–broker relationship); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220 (1987) (allowing arbitration of RICO claims). 
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which parties order their relations by contract.12  The potential for the 
abusive avoidance of law increased correspondingly. 
Despite a sustained chorus of academic concern,13 courts have 
largely failed to acknowledge the potential for this abuse.  They have 
retained in the new contexts the strong presumption of deference to 
arbitral awards that grew up around commercial and labor 
arbitration.14  In all cases today, even those such as employment 
discrimination that involve important personal rights, courts resist 
calls to review awards to ensure that arbitrators follow the law. 15  
They pay lip service to the need for arbitration to protect those 
rights,16 but without effective judicial review, there are no assurances 
that arbitrators will get the law right. 
The systemic decision to enforce arbitration awards without 
meaningful review amounts to a policy choice.  At least implicitly, we 
believe that the benefits of an expedited dispute resolution mechanism 
exceed the costs of a less thorough exploration of legal rights—even 
in cases where the parties have radically different bargaining power. 
This policy choice is backed by both analytical principle and legal 
doctrine.  The analytical principle is the familiar ideal of freedom of 
contract.  Courts venerate party autonomy.  They tend to see extreme 
deference to arbitral awards as necessary to protect the parties’ choice 
 
12 Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1638-40 (2005). 
13 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:  Rights “Waived” and 
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383 (1996) (arguing that the 
“Gilmer dicision carries alternative dispute resolution to excess”); Robert A. Gorman, The 
Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 
635, 678 (fearing that the “Gilmer decision . . . represents the beginning of a potentially 
vast reallocation of jurisdiction over employment disputes from civil courts and 
administrative agencies to privately selected arbitrators”); Martin H. Malin, Privatizing 
Justice—But by How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 589, 627 (2001) (positing that “[i]f courts do not review employment arbitration 
awards for errors of law, we risk transforming a system of public law into a system of 
private justice”); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law 
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 731 (1999) (arguing that “the ‘ground’ for 
inarbitrability must be judged [in each case] on its substance, not merely its label”).  But 
see Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration after Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come 
to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 406-08 (1998) (willing to accept 
the increased role of arbitration because it is a “finality-enhancing doctrine”). 
14 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 73-95 and accompanying text. 
16 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,  628 
(1985) (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”). 
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of arbitration as an alternative to adjudication.17  The legal doctrine 
comes from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),18 the primary statute 
governing judicial oversight of arbitration.  The FAA provides no 
express authority for substantive review of awards.19  While courts 
have grafted some common-law grounds for review onto the FAA, 
those grounds are extremely limited.  Courts point to the FAA as 
compelling extreme judicial deference to arbitral awards in all 
contexts. 
It is probably not possible to demonstrate empirically whether the 
benefits of unreviewable arbitration exceed the costs, either in 
individual cases or in the aggregate.20  Participant surveys might tell 
some of the story, but too many intangible factors, such as the social 
utility of public and formal adjudication, come into play to make such 
a determination meaningful.  At the end of the day, every policy 
argument in favor of arbitration without judicial review can be met by 
a contrary argument in favor of curtailing arbitration.21 
The fact that the policy debate has no clear resolution makes resort 
to the principle of party autonomy and the doctrine of the FAA 
critically important.  Those who favor the current system of virtually 
unlimited and unreviewable arbitration can forestall change—and 
even avoid engaging in a sustained policy discussion—by falling back 
on those defenses.  While it is not possible to resolve the policy issues 
finally, it is possible to assess whether the principle of party 
autonomy, coupled with applicable legal doctrine, justifies the degree 
of deference courts have adopted.  That is what I attempt in this 
Article.  I argue that, at least in certain classes of cases, the principle 
of party autonomy requires greater judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards.  
I argue further that this result is doctrinally compelled by basic tenets 
of contract law that operate independently of—and cannot be 
preempted by—the FAA. 
 
17 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (deferring 
to “the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when 
selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in 
the courts”).  
18 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. II 2001-2003). 
19 See id. § 10. 
20 For a good recent exploration of the costs and benefits of arbitration both for 
individuals and society, see Sternlight, supra note 12. 
21 See Covington, supra note 13, at 404 (“[E]rrors in law are important and arbitration 
opinions and awards should be subject to some sort of review.  Finality of awards is also 
important, however, and simply to state two important competing values does not itself 
dictate how to strike a balance between them.”). 
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In making these arguments, I rely on a particular model of 
arbitration—what I will call the contractarian model—that seems to 
animate the modern judicial attitude toward arbitration.22  In this 
model, the arbitrator is seen not as a substitute adjudicator, but as an 
agent of the parties tasked with interpreting the terms of their 
agreement.  The arbitrator’s decision is treated as if it were a contract 
term agreed upon by the parties.  Since the award under this model is 
the equivalent of a contract term, a court interested in promoting party 
autonomy will hesitate to upset it.  The court will focus on ensuring 
that the new “term” was properly “agreed upon”—that is, that the 
arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his agency and was not biased 
in some way.  And in fact, that is precisely the type of review 
contemplated by the FAA.23 
Viewed in these terms, the ritual conclusion that enforcing awards 
promotes party autonomy fails for two reasons.  First, it assumes that 
the parties mutually agreed to an arbitral decision that might ignore 
their legal rights.  In a contract of adhesion, we have no assurance that 
 
22 Professors Edward Brunet and Stephen Ware have used the similar terms “contract 
model” or “contractual approach” respectively, in reference to arbitration.  Edward Brunet, 
Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 
46 (1999); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1002-06 (1996) [hereinafter Ware, 
Arbitration and Unconscionability].  Professor Brunet refers to a “contract model” of 
arbitration, which is characterized by adjudication-type procedures specified by the parties 
in the agreement to arbitrate.  He distinguishes this model from “folklore arbitration,” 
which is characterized by equitable decisions made by experts in a particular field without 
formal processes.  Brunet, supra at 42-45, 47-51.  Similarly, Professor Ware defines the 
“contractual approach” to arbitration as encompassing three principles:  (1) courts should 
send parties to arbitration only where the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) arbitration 
agreements should be enforced except on grounds for revocation of a contract; and (3) 
arbitrators should not be permitted to reach a result that the parties could not have reached 
through contract.  See Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, in BRUNET EL AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 88-126 (2006) [hereinafter Ware, Interstate Arbitration]. 
 Despite the different emphases of their work, Professors Brunet and Ware both see a 
trend toward judicial deference to the parties’ agreement as a hallmark of contract-based 
arbitration.  That is a trend I emphasize as well.  I use the term “contractarian model” in a 
more narrow way, however, to refer to attitudes toward the arbitrator’s role, and more 
specifically, the nature of the award.  I argue that, regardless of the terms of the agreement, 
courts have come to see the award as equivalent to a contract term.  I distinguish this 
approach from one that views the award as equivalent to a judicial decision.  I argue that 
the choice of a model has consequences for the degree of judicial scrutiny to be expected.  
Ultimately, I come to a conclusion close to Professor Ware’s third principle above:  that 
courts need to be more careful to ensure that awards do not violate basic rules of contract 
law. 
23 See 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
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that assumption is justified.  The weaker party may be quite surprised 
to learn that an arbitrator can ignore the law without consequence.  
Courts avoid facing that problem by pointing to the absence of a 
meaningful standard of judicial review in the FAA.24  But a more 
probing doctrinal analysis reveals countervailing rules that compel 
substantive judicial review of awards. 
Understood through the perspective of the contractarian model, an 
arbitrator’s award is the equivalent of a contract term agreed upon by 
the parties.  In some instances the decision ultimately rendered is 
different from the one a court would have issued by applying rules of 
law.  If that decision is enforced, then the parties may be understood 
to have waived the legal rights that would have been protected by the 
application of the governing legal rule.  In itself, this is not a radical 
result.  Most legal rules are waivable, in the sense that we allow 
people to forgo the rights the rules would confer upon them if applied.  
That sort of waiver is uncontroversial when it is a free and informed 
choice and is done after the rights in question have matured. 
It is a different thing to agree prospectively to forgo the rights that 
a legal rule might confer in the future.  When parties enter into an 
arbitration agreement, they agree to abide by a decision to be made in 
the future about a dispute that has not yet arisen.  The waiver 
occasioned by an arbitrator’s award in derogation of law is both 
prospective, in the sense that it is made before the rights in question 
have matured, and ill-informed, in that the party does not know the 
effect of the waiver at the time it is made.  This makes an “arbitral 
waiver” an extraordinary legal consequence and one that contravenes 
basic principles of contract law, at least in some situations. 
To reach this conclusion is to conclude that the FAA cannot do the 
heavy lifting in support of unreviewable arbitration that has often 
been assumed.  Section 2 of the FAA expressly incorporates state 
contract law by requiring courts to enforce arbitration agreements 
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”25  Interpreting this provision in Doctor’s Associates, 
 
24 See, e.g., Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that the only substantive review permitted under the FAA is into whether the 
arbitrator interpreted the contract); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 
743, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that “an arbitrator’s conclusions on substantive 
matters may be vacated only when the award demonstrates a manifest disregard of the law 
where the arbitrators correctly state the law and then proceed to disregard it, if the award is 
otherwise irrational, or if any of the explicit grounds for vacation or modification set forth 
in sections 10 and 11 of the Act are present”). 
25 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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Inc. v. Casarotto, the Supreme Court held that “generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be 
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening” the 
FAA.26  If contract law effectively requires that arbitrators follow the 
law, as I will argue it often does, then the FAA cannot provide courts 
license to decline review of arbitral awards. 
With that, the debate returns to the principle of party autonomy.  
Again, sometimes good reasons exist for enforcing arbitral decisions 
that effectively waive legal rights.  Parties may knowingly and 
voluntarily choose arbitration precisely because they do not want their 
disputes resolved through the application of legal rules. 
For a variety of reasons, we have made a societal commitment over 
the last several decades to promote alternative forms of dispute 
resolution.27  We do not force people to litigate every dispute to a 
final judicial resolution; accordingly, we should also not make 
arbitration into a parallel system of litigation.  Where parties 
genuinely want to resolve their dispute without resort to legal rules—
where they voluntarily and knowingly choose to avoid law—we 
should normally let them do so.  That is, after all, frequently what 
settlement entails. 
That conclusion amounts to no more than saying that informed and 
voluntary waivers should be enforced.  The problem is that in many 
cases the parties do not intend to forgo their legal rights.  They choose 
arbitration because they want a more economical or more private 
forum in which to resolve the legal disputes that might arise between 
them.28  To enforce an arbitral award that is contrary to law in such a 
case is to impose an uninformed and unanticipated waiver on one or 
both parties.  The real dilemma for courts is to distinguish the cases in 
which the parties genuinely envisioned arbitration as an alternative to 
law and those in which the parties wanted only an alternative to 
formal adjudicative process.  Those in the former category do not 
require judicial review beyond that currently offered.  But those in the 
 
26 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (referring to section 2 of the FAA specifically).  See also 
Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1644-45 (arguing that contractual and common-law 
approaches have been more successful than constitutional or federal statutory arguments 
challenging arbitration clauses); Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability, supra note 22, 
at 1008-10 (explaining that after Doctor’s Associates, state unconscionability law would 
be applied to the FAA). 
27 See generally Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986) (providing a history of, and 
the rationale behind, the growth of ADR in the 1970s and ’80s). 
28 See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 2240-43. 
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latter category require some heightened standard to ensure a basic 
degree of compliance with law. 
In order to avoid embroiling courts in factual disputes about the 
parties’ prearbitration intentions, I will suggest that the selection of a 
standard of judicial review turn on objectively identifiable criteria.  
Those criteria should be used to determine a presumptive standard of 
review.  This standard would apply in the absence of a clear 
manifestation of intent by the parties to select some other standard.  
The criteria should include considerations of bargaining power, the 
nature of the parties’ relationship, and the legal rights and obligations 
at stake. 
I will begin my analysis with a brief overview of the evolution of 
judicial attitudes toward arbitration.  I will show both how courts have 
come to accept arbitration in virtually all contexts and how they have 
adopted a posture of extreme deference to awards.  With that 
background in place, I will discuss the two competing models of 
arbitration—the first viewing arbitration as private adjudication and 
the second viewing it as a species of contract.  I will then explain why 
the contractarian model better represents modern judicial attitudes 
toward arbitration.  Next, I will discuss the law governing waivers of 
legal rights through contract to show how deference to arbitral awards 
can contravene generally applicable rules of contract formation.  
Finally, I will return to the topic of party autonomy and suggest a 
framework that courts can use in identifying the appropriate standard 
of review for awards. 
I 
ARBITRATION IN THE COURTS:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF RAPID CHANGE 
In the last one hundred years, courts in the United States moved 
from an attitude of skepticism towards arbitration to an attitude that 
validates agreements to arbitrate and defers to arbitrators as agents of 
the parties.  The result is a modern dispute resolution environment in 
which arbitration agreements are enforced in virtually all contexts and 
arbitral awards are almost universally upheld. 
A.  Common Law Attitudes Toward Arbitration 
Private arbitration predates the public court system.  Early Roman 
and English law relied primarily on self-help; when parties mutually 
desired an adjudicated resolution to a dispute, they went to an 
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arbitrator.29 Arbitration has, therefore, historically functioned as an 
adjudicative dispute resolution mechanism. 
As the public court system arose and matured in England, it 
displaced private arbitration in providing the primary adjudicative 
function.  Arbitrators represented unwelcome competition for 
common-law judges, whose compensation was tied in part to court 
fees.30  Judges thus had powerful incentives to increase their 
jurisdiction and stifle competing dispute resolution mechanisms. 31  
As a result, until the twentieth century, courts tended to view 
arbitration skeptically.  They typically refused to enforce agreements 
to arbitrate on the ground that the parties could not “oust” the court of 
its jurisdiction.32 
Once parties voluntarily submitted a dispute to arbitration, courts 
treated the resulting award as a binding obligation.33  But that did not 
 
29 See 14 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (A.L. Goodhart & 
H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956). 
30 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 235, 241 (1979). 
31 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5 (1956) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (noting that English courts fought “for extension of jurisdiction—all of 
them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of 
jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 See Thompson v. Charnock, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1310 (K.B.) (Kenyon, C.J.) (“It is 
not necessary, now, to say how this point ought to be determined if it were res integra, it 
having been decided again and again that an agreement to refer matters in difference to 
arbitration, is not sufficient to oust courts of law and equity of their jurisdiction.”); Kill v. 
Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B.).  
Early American courts adopted the same rule and maintained it throughout the nineteenth 
century.  See Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 
1914) (Cardozo, J.) (“If jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the 
failure of justice that may result from these and like causes. It is true that some judges 
have expressed the belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as 
they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the contrary.”); Hurst v. 
Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (“Such stipulations [to arbitrate] are regarded as 
against the policy of the common law, as having a tendency to exclude the jurisdiction of 
the courts, provided by the government with ample means to entertain and decide all legal 
controversies.”) . 
33 See Tankersley v. Richardson, 2 Stew. 130, 132 (Ala. 1829) (“The adjustment of 
controversies and suits by arbitration, is a species of remedy much favored by legislation; 
so much so, that, not only what can be, is intended in its favor, but it will not be permitted 
to be impugned for any extrinsic cause; unless it be founded in corruption, partiality, or 
other undue means.”); Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (Mich. 1888) (“Courts . . . favor 
awards made by tribunals of the parties’ own choosing, and are reluctant to set them aside, 
and every presumption will be made in favor of their fairness, and the burden of proof is 
upon the party seeking to set them aside, and the proof must be clear and strong.”) 
(citations omitted); Winship v. Jewett, 1 Barb. Ch. 173, 184-85 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) (“[T]he 
award, if made in good faith, is conclusive upon the parties . . . .  Neither will it constitute 
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mean that awards were enforceable as judgments.  Where a losing 
party to arbitration refused to comply with the award, the prevailing 
party’s only option at law was to sue in either assumpsit or debt to 
recover on the obligation.34  That option was little better than suing 
on the underlying dispute.35  A better alternative was to sue in equity 
for specific performance of the obligation.36 
A losing party seeking to avoid its obligations under an award had 
no option at law.37  Its only choice was to seek specific relief from the 
obligation in a court of equity.38  The equity courts analogized to the 
law of contract.  They held that they could overturn an award only on 
the grounds for rescission of a contract, most notably fraud or 
mistake, or on a showing of bias by the arbitrator.39  Most courts 
applying that standard gave great deference to arbitrators’ awards, 
summarily rejecting attempts to vacate awards not supported by 
strong evidence of fraud or partiality.40 
 
any defence [sic] . . . to show that after the award had been published, [the arbitrator] 
dissented from it.”). 
34 See Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law:  Arbitration Before the 
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 447 (1984). 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See Newland v. Douglass, 2 Johns. 62, 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806) (“The evidence was 
inadmissible, and a suit at law will not lie to re-examine the merits of an award.  A court of 
chancery may correct a palpable mistake or miscalculation made by the arbitrators, or 
relieve against their partiality or corruption.  But there is no such remedy at law, in a case 
of submission, not within the statute.”) (citations omitted). 
38 See Herrick v. Estate of Belknap, 27 Vt. 673, 683-84 (1854) (“We may here, perhaps, 
look into the general rules of decision in courts of equity, which must govern this case.  
The claim put forth in the bill, being either mistake or fraud in the estimates, is one clearly 
of equity cognizance.  Fraud, accident, and mistake form appropriate branches of the 
general jurisdiction of the court of chancery in England and in this state.”). 
39 See id. 
40 See, e.g., Davy’s Ex’rs v. Faw, 11 U.S. 171, 174 (1812) (“[J]udges chosen by the 
parties themselves as well as those who are constituted by law, ought to be exempt from 
all imputation of partiality or corruption; . . . corrupt motives are not lightly to be ascribed 
to the arbiter, nor is partiality to be attributed to him on account of difference of opinion 
with respect to the decision he has made.”); Port Huron & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Callanan, 34 
N.W. 678, 679 (Mich. 1887) (“There is power in a court of equity to relieve against 
awards in some cases where there has been fraud and misconduct in the arbitrators, or they 
have acted under manifest mistake, and perhaps in some defined and undefined cases.  But 
it is evident that there are great objections to any general interference by courts with 
awards.”); Campbell v. Western, 3 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 84 (Ch. 1832) (declining to vacate 
award on grounds of legal error in the admission of evidence where there was no evidence 
of fraud or bias). 
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A significant number of nineteenth-century courts sitting in equity, 
however, used mistake grounds to exercise relatively extensive 
review of arbitral awards.41  While simultaneously affirming the 
power of arbitrators to decide disputed questions of law and of fact, 
these courts vacated awards for mistakes of law and fact provided the 
mistake appeared on the face of the award.42  In the words of Justice 
Story: 
In regard to a mistake of the arbitrators, it may be in a matter of 
fact, or in a matter of law.  If, upon the face of the award, there is a 
plain mistake of law, or of fact, material to the decision, which 
misled the judgment of the arbitrators, there can be little or no 
reason to doubt that courts of equity will grant relief.43 
Story emphasized that a mistake of law would constitute grounds 
for relief only if the arbitrators intended to rely on the legal rule.44  In 
contrast, “[i]f they admit the law, but decide contrary thereto upon 
principles of equity and good conscience,” the award could not be set 
aside.45  Furthermore, arbitrators’ decisions “upon a doubtful point of 
law, or in a case where the question of law itself is designedly left to 
their judgment and decision, will generally be held conclusive.”46  In 
those latter two situations, no “mistake” would have been made, so no 
ground for vacatur would exist. 
This doctrine of mistake gave courts, as a practical matter, 
relatively broad leeway to overturn awards.  For example, in Tillard’s 
Lessee v. Fisher,47 the plaintiff brought an ejectment action to recover 
property from the defendant, who had occupied the disputed property 
for more than twenty years.  The arbitrators found for the plaintiff.  
The court set aside the award as being contrary to law on its face 
because the arbitrators failed to recognize the running of the statute of 
limitations.48 
 
41 But see Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 350 (1855) (“Courts should be careful to 
avoid a wrong use of the word ‘mistake,’ and, by making it synonymous with mere error 
of judgment, assume to themselves an arbitrary power over awards.”). 
42 See, e.g., Kleine v. Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7869); White 
Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 77 N.E. 327 (Ill. 1906); Heuitt v. State ex rel. Brown, 6 H. & 
J. 95 (Md. 1823) . 
43 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1453, at 791 (11th 
ed. 1873). 
44 Id. § 1455, at 792. 
45 Id. § 1455, at 792-93. 
46 Id. 
47 3 H. & McH. 118 (Md. 1793). 
48 Id. at 121. 
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By refusing to enforce arbitration agreements and imposing a 
relatively robust doctrine of review of arbitral awards, eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century common-law courts signaled a faith in traditional 
legal forms and a suspicion of alternatives.  In keeping with the public 
sentiment of the time, these courts venerated both common-law 
process and, more importantly, the jury.49  For them, the loss of a jury 
trial was the loss of one of the most fundamental rights.50  The 
prospective waiver of such a fundamental right was anathema, and it 
was simply disallowed. 
B.  The Federal Arbitration Act and the Courts’ Reaction 
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act51 with the 
express purpose of abrogating judicial resistance to the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements.52  The FAA confers a right to apply to a 
federal district court to enforce an arbitration agreement in a “contract 
evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce.”53  A party 
seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement may move to compel a 
reluctant party to proceed with arbitration.54  Alternatively, a party 
may move to stay litigation if litigation has already been 
commenced.55  The FAA also provides a mechanism for judicial 
enforcement of awards.56  The ways courts reacted to the provisions 
requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements and the provision for 
enforcement of awards reveal their evolving attitudes toward 
arbitration. 
 
49 See supra note 32 for examples of these cases. 
50 See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 243 (1819) (“[T]his Court would 
ponder long, before it . . . produced a total prostration of the trial by jury, or even involved 
the defendant in circumstances which rendered that right unavailing for his protection.”). 
51 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  When enacted, the FAA was called the United States 
Arbitration Act.  Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence of a Federal 
General Common Law of Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197, 205 (2006). 
52 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (“[T]he basic 
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate.”). 
53 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
54 Id. § 4. 
55 Id. § 3. 
56 See id. § 9. 
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1.  The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
For a number of years after the enactment of the FAA, courts 
continued to see arbitration as, at best, a second-class alternative to 
formal adjudication.  Consequently, they initially interpreted the FAA 
narrowly.  The Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan57 is 
the most prominent example of that mindset.  Wilko addressed the 
application of the FAA to a dispute arising under the securities laws.  
An investor argued that he should not be required to arbitrate his 
fraud claims against a brokerage despite the existence of an 
arbitration clause in his brokerage agreement.58  He based this 
argument on a provision of the Securities Act of 1933 declaring void 
any “condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring 
any security to waive compliance with any provision” of the Act. 59  
He argued that arbitration “lacks the certainty of a suit at law under 
the Act to enforce his rights” and that the arbitration clause 
effectively waived compliance with the provision of the Act 
conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the district courts and state 
courts.60 
The Supreme Court refused to compel arbitration of the Securities 
Act claims.61  The Court focused on the inadequacy of arbitration as a 
substitute for formal adjudication.62  Notably, it never contemplated 
that an arbitrator would be free to ignore the law.  Instead, the Court 
emphasized that the arbitrators would not have a judge to instruct 
them on the law.63  It further stated that even conceding arbitrators’ 
obligation to apply the law, they would be under no obligation to 
produce a reasoned opinion allowing for meaningful judicial 
review.64  On that basis, the Court held that the Securities Act 
precluded enforcement of the arbitration agreement.65 
During this period, the Court threw its support behind arbitration in 
cases that did not involve statutory claims.  The Steelworkers trilogy 
 
57 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
58 Id. at 429. 
59 Id. at 430 n.6, 432. 
60 Id. at 432-33. 
61 Id. at 438. 
62 Id. at 436-37. 
63 Id. at 436. 
64 Id. at 436-37. 
65 Id. at 438. 
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cemented arbitration as the primary mechanism for resolving labor–
management disputes. 66  Further, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Manufacturing Co.67 confirmed the broad enforceability of 
arbitration agreements in commercial cases by holding that even the 
issue of fraud in the inducement of the agreement to arbitrate must be 
decided by the arbitrator.68 
Still, the Court remained hesitant about enforcing arbitration 
agreements where statutory rights were at issue. Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co.69 seemed to reinforce Wilko’s antipathy toward 
the arbitration of statutory claims.  In Gardner-Denver, an employee 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement had arbitrated an 
employment discrimination grievance.70  The arbitrator ruled against 
him, and he then filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.71  The Supreme Court held that the arbitration did not 
affect his right to file suit because the claims arising under the 
bargaining agreement were “distinctly separate” from the statutory 
claims.72  The Court concluded that “[a]rbitral procedures, while well 
suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a 
comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights 
created by Title VII.”73  In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted 
several reasons why arbitration is an inferior procedural forum.  
These included arbitrators’ potential lack of specialized legal 
knowledge, the informality of arbitration procedures, and the absence 
of mandatory written opinions.74 
Faced with a clash between the Steelworkers trilogy’s principle of 
arbitrability of labor disputes and Wilko’s principle of nonarbitrability 
of statutory claims, the Gardner-Denver Court followed Wilko.  The 
Court saw the statutory rights at issue as too important to commit to 
an inferior alternative process, even if that process arose out of a 
collective bargaining agreement.  But the Court’s reticence did not 
last long.  In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,75 decided the same year as 
 
66 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
67 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
68 Id. at 403-04. 
69 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
70 Id. at 40-42. 
71 Id. at 42-43. 
72 Id. at 50. 
73 Id. at 56. 
74 See id. at 57-58. 
75 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
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Gardner-Denver, a German citizen sought to enforce an arbitration 
agreement after he was sued by an American company for fraud 
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.76  The 
Supreme Court held the agreement enforceable and distinguished 
Wilko.  The Court concluded that the nature of the statutory rights at 
issue was different because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
implied a private right of action whereas the Securities Act of 1933 
expressly provided a “special right.”77  It also found an important 
distinction in the fact that the transaction in Scherk involved parties to 
an international agreement, whereas Wilko involved a private U.S. 
citizen suing other U.S. citizens.78 
Because the Scherk Court refused to overturn Wilko, it left an 
anomaly in which claims asserted under the Securities Act of 1933 
were not arbitrable, but claims asserted under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 were arbitrable.  It also left the Court’s position on 
arbitrability generally unclear.  The Court seemed to announce a 
policy in Scherk favoring arbitration even in statutory cases.  At the 
same time, it seemed to backtrack in Gardner-Denver from its 
established policy of favoring arbitration in labor disputes. 
By the mid-1980s, however, the composition of the Supreme Court 
had changed, and beginning with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,79 the Court firmly committed itself to 
arbitrability in virtually every context.  Mitsubishi, like Scherk, 
involved a dispute arising out of an international commercial 
agreement.80  But instead of securities fraud, the claims alleged 
antitrust violations.81  The Supreme Court held the antitrust claims 
arbitrable, finding that the statutory rights at issue could be 
“effectively vindicated” in arbitration.82  Two years later, in 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,83 the Court extended 
Scherk by enforcing an arbitration clause in a case alleging garden-
variety fraud claims against a securities broker under the Securities 
 
76 Id. at 509. 
77 Id. at 513-14. 
78 Id. at 515. 
79 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
80 Id. at 616-17. 
81 Id. at 624-25. 
82 Id. at 636-37. 
83 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
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Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO.84 Two years after that, in 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,85 the Court 
finally put Wilko to rest by holding claims under the Securities Act of 
1933 arbitrable.86  And in the 1991 case Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp.,87 the Court enforced an arbitration clause in a dispute 
involving employment discrimination claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.88  That decision crippled 
Gardner-Denver, without overruling it, by limiting it to cases 
involving parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement.  In 
each of these decisions, the Court rejected the “suspicion of 
arbitration” and emphasized arbitration’s effectiveness in vindicating 
statutory rights.89 
Since the early 1990s, the Court has remained steadfast in its 
support for arbitration as an alternative to formal adjudication.  It has 
recognized only one limitation on arbitrability:  cost.  In Green Tree 
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,90 a home purchaser argued 
that she should not have to arbitrate her fraud claims against her 
lender.91  She asserted that the cost of arbitration would be so high it 
would dissuade her and others like her from taking action to enforce 
statutory rights. 92  The Supreme Court found a lack of evidence in the 
record to show how expensive arbitration would be, but it 
acknowledged that a claim of this type might have validity:  “It may 
well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a 
litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”93  Lower courts have relied on 
Green Tree to refuse enforcement of fee-splitting provisions in 
arbitration clauses that would have the effect of imposing costs on 
 
84 Id. at 223.  The aggrieved investors alleged “fraudulent, excessive trading on 
respondents’ accounts and . . . making false statements and omitting material facts from 
the advice given to respondents.”  Id. 
85 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
86 Id. at 485 (explicitly overruling Wilko). 
87 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
88 Id. at 35. 
89 See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30; McMahon, 482 
U.S. at 226. 
90 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
91 Id. at 83-84. 
92 Id. at 84. 
93 Id. at 90. 
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arbitration claimants that would exceed the court costs a litigant 
would be likely to face.94 
In sum, over the last two decades the Supreme Court has removed 
virtually every obstacle to arbitration.  Any claim, including statutory 
claims under the discrimination laws, is potentially arbitrable.  And 
any party, including those with radically unequal bargaining power, 
can be held to an arbitration agreement.  The only current limitation 
appears to be cost.  The stronger party apparently may not force the 
weaker to bear the cost of the arbitration if that cost would deter the 
other party from seeking vindication of important legal rights. 
These developments represent a dramatic change in the way courts 
view themselves and the judicial dispute resolution system.  The 
Supreme Court no longer sees arbitration as an inferior substitute for 
formal adjudication.  To the contrary, it has embraced the alternative 
to the very system at whose pinnacle it sits.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court seems to prefer arbitration to adjudication. 
2.  The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
The starting point for discussion of standards of judicial review of 
arbitral awards is the FAA, which in section 10 contains a list of four 
grounds for vacating arbitral awards: 
(1)  where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; 
(2)  where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3)  where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any 
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or 
(4)  where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the 
subject matter submitted was not made.95 
 
94 See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 
1999) (holding that a fee-splitting clause requiring claimant to pay one-half of arbitration 
costs “failed to provide an accessible forum in which [claimant] could resolve his statutory 
rights”). 
95 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. II 2001-2003). 
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Because the Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts 
virtually all state arbitration law96 (absent an express agreement by 
the parties to invoke it),97 and because section 10 appears on its face 
to provide the exclusive grounds for vacating awards, no other test of 
judicial review seems necessary. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and every circuit court have 
found grounds for overturning awards that are not specifically 
mentioned in section 10.98  Three separate, non-statutory grounds for 
review have emerged:  the “essence” test,  the public policy test, and 
the test for legal error usually formulated in terms of “manifest 
disregard” of the law. 
The “essence” test comes from United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp.,99 one of the cases in the Steelworkers trilogy, in 
which the Court said that an “award is legitimate only so long as it 
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”100  By 
that, the Court apparently meant that the award must be arguably 
contemplated by an agreement and not simply contrived by the 
arbitrator from other sources.  As the Court said in United 
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.:101 
[T]he arbitrator’s award settling a dispute with respect to the 
interpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its 
essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator’s 
own notions of industrial justice.  But as long as the arbitrator is 
even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within 
 
96 See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (holding that the “FAA 
encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually ‘in commerce’”); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995) (holding that FAA 
reaches any contract “affecting” interstate commerce); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (holding that state law invalidating certain arbitration agreements 
violates the Supremacy Clause).  
97 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989) (noting that “the FAA’s primary purpose [is] ensuring that private 
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms”). 
98 The “exceeded powers” clause of section 10 is arguably broad enough to encompass 
a wide range of grounds for vacating awards, and some courts have referred to it in 
applying what are essentially judicially derived standards of review.  See Stephen L. 
Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration 
Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 756-62 (1996).  For purposes of this Article, I treat any test 
not explicitly stated in section 10 as a non-statutory ground. 
99 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
100 Id. at 597. 
101 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
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the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed 
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.102 
Lower courts have elaborated.  The Fifth Circuit has said that, for 
an award to draw its essence from a contract, it “must have a basis 
that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the 
letter or purpose of the . . . agreement. . . . [T]he award must, in some 
logical way, be derived from the wording or purpose of the 
contract.”103 
Awards have been found not drawn from the essence of a contract 
primarily when the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the 
agreement.  In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Teamsters Local 243,104 the 
Sixth Circuit refused to enforce an award granting reinstatement to 
employees when an arbitrator ignored plain language in their 
employment contract.105  The arbitrator awarded back pay to the 
employees whose jobs had been subcontracted out even though plain 
language in the contract gave the employer the right to subcontract 
work.106  The court emphasized that “an arbitrator may construe 
ambiguous contract language, but lacks authority to disregard or 
modify plain or unambiguous contract provisions.”107  Because most 
disputes do not involve contract language that is unambiguous, the 
essence test seldom provides a basis for overturning awards. 
In addition to validating the essence test, Misco recognized and 
refined a second non-statutory ground for reviewing awards: public 
policy.108  The Court in Misco upheld an arbitrator’s award 
reinstating an employee who had been discharged for violating a 
company rule against possession of drugs on company property. 109  
The employee had been caught in the backseat of a car in the 
 
102 Id. at 38. 
103 Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
104 683 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1982). 
105 Id. at 155. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (citing Detroit Coil v. Int. Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 594 F.2d 
575 (6th Cir. 1979); Local Union No. 89 v. Hays & Nicoulin, 594 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 
1979); Amanda Bent Bolt v. UAW Local 1549, 451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971)). 
108 Initially, “public policy” was used as a means to review awards by the Court in 
1983.  See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum 
& Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (holding that “a court may not enforce a 
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy”) (citing Hurd v. Hodge, 
334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948)). 
109 United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 33-35 (1987). 
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company parking lot with marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted 
marijuana cigarette in the front-seat ashtray.110  The Court first 
concluded that none of the express grounds in section 10 warranted 
vacating the award because there was no evidence of affirmative 
misconduct by the arbitrator.111  Then it acknowledged that an award 
might be set aside even in the absence of those grounds if it violated 
public policy.112 
The Court had mentioned the public policy ground before,113 and 
lower courts had applied it for years.114  But much confusion existed 
about the nature of the policy that had to be violated in order to justify 
vacatur.  Some lower courts had been vacating awards based on 
generalized conclusions that the award contravened amorphous public 
policy goals.115  The Court in Misco explained that such a policy 
must “be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents 
and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’” 116  
It also required that the award “explicitly conflict” with that policy.117  
The Court recognized that it might be a bad idea to allow employees 
to work with heavy machinery when they have used drugs on 
company property.  But it concluded that the arbitrator’s award to that 
effect did not conflict with any clearly defined public policy.118 
In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers,119 the 
Court refined the public policy test further while refusing to vacate an 
award reinstating a truck driver who twice tested positive for 
marijuana.120  The Court addressed whether sufficient grounds for 
 
110 Id. at 33.  However, the arbitrator had refused to consider that evidence because it 
was discovered after the decision to terminate had been made.  Id. 
111 Id. at 40. 
112 Id. at 43 (“[A] court may refuse to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement when 
the specific terms contained in that agreement violate public policy.”). 
113 See W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766. 
114 See Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy 
Grounds:  Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91, 95 (2000) 
(collecting seventy-three cases between 1960 and 1988 where the public policy argument 
was the primary claim). 
115 Id. at 101-15 (discussing how different circuit courts deal with the public policy 
argument generally). 
116 United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting 
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 44-45. 
119 531 U.S. 57 (2000). 
120 Id. at 65-66. 
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vacatur are present when an award is “contrary to public policy as 
ascertained by reference to positive law” or whether the award must 
affirmatively “violate” positive law.121  The Court refused to adopt 
the latter standard as a firm rule.122  However, it emphasized the 
narrow scope of the public policy ground and suggested that it would 
be very rare for an award to warrant vacatur on public policy grounds 
without violating positive law.123  It concluded that the award did not 
merit vacatur because neither Congress nor the relevant regulatory 
agencies had expressly prohibited an employer from allowing an 
employee who tested positive for drugs to remain on the job.124 
Eastern Associated Coal establishes an extremely narrow ground 
for public policy review of arbitral awards.  Apparently, a party 
seeking to vacate an award will have to identify a specific rule of law 
violated by the award.  In other words, the party must show that the 
award, if made a contract term, would have rendered the contract 
unenforceable as illegal.  That is a high burden to meet.  In fact, very 
few cases since Eastern Associated Coal have found public policy 
grounds sufficient to vacate awards, and most of these have come 
from state courts. 125 
The essence test and the public policy test deal with the extreme 
cases in which an arbitrator either ignores contract language or enters 
an award that directly violates a rule of positive law.  Nevertheless, 
most courts, including the Supreme Court, have indicated a 
willingness to consider arguments that an award is legally wrong, 
even if it is derived in some way from contract language and does not 
violate public policy.  A number of formulations have emerged for 
identifying remediable arbitral error in these circumstances including 
“manifest disregard,” “completely irrational,” and “arbitrary and 
capricious.”  By far the most commonly employed is the “manifest 
disregard” test, which originated in dicta in Wilko.126 
 
121 Id. at 63. 
122 Id. at 67. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 66-67. 
125 See Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2 v. City of Chicago, 751 N.E.2d 1169 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001); City of Brooklyn Center v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635 
N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Buffalo, 
830 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 2005). 
126 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  The only circuit not to adopt 
some form of the manifest disregard test is the Seventh Circuit.  See George Watts & Son, 
Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).  The court in Watts did not conclude 
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In responding to the argument that arbitration provided an 
equivalent process to adjudication, the Court in Wilko reiterated the 
limits of judicial review of arbitral awards:  “interpretations of the law 
by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject . . . 
to judicial review for error in interpretation.”127  The Court thus 
suggested that awards demonstrating “manifest disregard”—whatever 
that might entail—could be vacated.  The Court recently reaffirmed 
the manifest disregard test, again in dicta, in First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.128 
The lower courts have been highly inconsistent in applying the 
manifest disregard standard.129  Most have applied the test to 
questions of law.  That is, they vacate awards upon a showing that the 
arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law.130  More 
specifically, most of these courts require evidence of a conscious 
decision by the arbitrator to decide contrary to a clearly applicable 
governing rule.  The Second Circuit has explained: 
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and 
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an 
arbitrator.  Moreover, the term “disregard” implies that the 
arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal 
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. . . . The 
governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must 
be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.131 
Some courts have invoked standards of review focusing not on the 
arbitrator’s conscious failure to follow governing legal rules, but on 
the rationality of the award.  For example, in Swift Industries, Inc. v. 
 
that the manifest disregard test does not exist; it simply concluded that the test is 
functionally equivalent to the public policy test as elaborated in Eastern Associated Coal.  
Id. at 580. 
127 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasis added). 
128 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 
129 See Watts, 248 F.3d at 579-80 (discussing inconsistencies in case law and referring 
to Supreme Court application of the manifest disregard standard as “opaque”). 
130 See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of 
the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 471-72 (1998).  Some courts have gone even further and 
suggested that manifest disregard might be grounds for vacating an award demonstrating a 
clear factual error.  See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998). 
131 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).  See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n arbitration panel does not act in manifest 
disregard of the law unless (1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not 
subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.”). 
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Botany Industries, Inc.,132 the Third Circuit vacated an award because 
of its “complete lack of rationality” after concluding that the 
agreement could not be read to allow for the type of award the 
arbitrator granted.133  In that form, the irrationality test looks much 
like the “essence” test from Enterprise Wheel.134 
Courts have occasionally discussed rationality in the context of 
alleged errors of law, but they have refrained from vacating awards on 
that basis.135  At most, they have sometimes remanded for additional 
explanation where an award appears irrational on its face and lacks 
any stated rationale.136  In Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & 
Curtis, Inc.,137 for example, the district court for the District of 
Columbia concluded that “a court should not attempt to enforce an 
award that is ambiguous, indefinite or irrational.”138  The court went 
on to state that “[a]lthough a court is precluded from overturning 
errors in factual determinations, ‘nevertheless, if an examination of 
the record before the arbitrator reveals no support whatever for his 
determinations, his award must be vacated.’”139 The court remanded, 
directing the arbitrator to explain an award that granted the claimants 
less than twenty percent of their apparent losses.140 
 
132 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972). 
133 Id. at 1135.  See also Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. 1972) (holding 
that “[s]ave for ‘complete irrationality’, arbitrators are free to fashion the applicable rules 
and determine the facts of a dispute before them without their award being subject to 
judicial revision.”). 
134 See Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(treating the “completely irrational” test and the “essence” test as equivalent); Indus. Mut. 
Ass’n v. Amalgamated Workers, Local Union No. 383, 725 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(conflating the two tests); Detroit Coil Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, Lodge #82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1979) (requiring that the arbitrator’s 
award draws its “essence” from the collective bargaining agreement and that it is “derived 
in some rational way from the collective bargaining agreement”). 
135 See, e.g., Bettencourt v. Boston Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1049 (1st Cir. 1977) 
(finding no “manifest error of law” sufficient to warrant vacating award). 
136 See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 105-06 (1997). 
137 674 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1987). 
138 Id. at 922. 
139 Id. (quoting NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 524 F.2d 756, 760 (3d Cir. 
1975)). 
140 Id. at 921. 
KIRGIS.FMT 7/24/2015  8:25 AM 
2006] The Contractarian Model of Arbitration  125 
C.  Current Trends and Conclusions 
Lower courts seem to be hearing an increasing number of 
challenges to arbitral awards.  In particular, challenges asserting that 
awards are in manifest disregard of the law have increased markedly 
since the Supreme Court reaffirmed that test in its 1995 decision in 
First Options.  In the five years from 1990 through 1994, an average 
of just under seven reported federal district court decisions per year 
discussed manifest disregard as a ground for vacating an arbitral 
award.141  In the five years from 2000 through 2004, that number 
more than doubled to almost seventeen reported district court 
decisions per year.142 
Although the number of cases raising manifest disregard seems to 
be increasing, it remains extremely rare for courts to vacate awards on 
that ground.  Of the reported cases in the periods from 1990 to 1994 
and 2000 to 2004, not a single district court vacated an award on 
 
141 These figures were derived from Westlaw searches in the federal district courts 
database.  Bankruptcy courts are included.  I searched for cases covered by West’s key 
number for judicial review of arbitral awards in which the term “manifest disregard” 
appears.  In some of the cases, the courts simply referred to manifest disregard as one 
possible basis for vacating an award, even though no party relied on manifest disregard to 
challenge the award in question. 
142 Based on Westlaw searches of the federal district court database the number of 
reported district court decisions discussing “manifest disregard” as a ground for judicial 
review of arbitral awards for each year from 1990 through 2004 are as follows: 
 
 
 
YEAR NUMBER OF DECISIONS 
      2004  16 
      2003 21 
       2002  16 
      2001  15 
     2000  15 
     1999  15 
     1998  18 
     1997  13 
     1996   9 
     1995   8 
     1994      7 
     1993  8 
     1992    6 
     1991    6 
     1990    7 
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manifest disregard grounds.143  Two courts vacated awards on other 
grounds tied to arbitrator irrationality, but both were reversed on 
appeal.144  Several other courts remanded cases to the arbitrators for 
clarification.145 
A handful of circuit courts have vacated awards on manifest 
disregard grounds,146 sometimes affirming unpublished district court 
decisions.147  Undoubtedly a number of other district courts also 
vacated awards without publishing opinions.  But it seems clear that 
only a small fraction of challenges to awards based on manifest 
disregard and related standards succeed, and few even receive 
meaningful review. 
 
143 However, courts vacated awards on other grounds. See Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. 
Aloha Airlines, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1206 (D. Haw. 2001) (determining that award 
did not draw its essence from the contract because it was issued by only one member of 
the panel of arbitrators); NCR Corp. v. CBS Liquor Control, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 168, 175 
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that arbitrator exceeded powers); In re Arbitration Between 
Household Mfg., Inc. & Kowin Dev. Corp., 822 F. Supp. 505, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
(finding that arbitrator awarded same amount of damages to single party twice); A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCullough, 764 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1991) 
(determining that party procured award by “undue means” by making blatantly false 
statements of law); Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. v. Triumph Tankers Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 
288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that arbitrators exceeded their power). 
144 See Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725-26 (S.D. 
Miss. 2003) (vacating damage award by arbitrator because its calculation was “arbitrary 
and capricious”), rev’d, Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 
2004); Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 
(D. Mass. 2001) (vacating after finding no “tenable ground” for the acceleration of an 
award), vacated with an order to enforce the arbitral award, Wonderland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 274 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2001). 
145 See Lummus Global Amazonas, S.A. v. Aguaytia Energy del Peru S.R. Ltda., 256 F. 
Supp. 2d 594, 650 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Weinberg v. Silber, 140 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 (N.D. 
Tex. 2001); Collins & Aikman Floor Coverings Corp. v. Froehlich, 736 F. Supp. 480, 487-
88 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
146 See Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., L.L.C., 341 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(finding that “since 1960 we have vacated some part or all of an arbitral award for 
manifest disregard in . . . four out of at least 48 cases where we applied the standard”) 
(quoting Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (alteration in original). 
147 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 845 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Gas Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard Avista Energy, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 1060, 1069 (8th 
Cir. 2003). 
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II 
FROM ADJUDICATION TO CONTRACT:  TWO MODELS OF 
ARBITRATION 
As arbitration has become an increasingly pervasive feature of the 
dispute resolution landscape, two theories, or models, of arbitration 
have emerged.148  These models, which I will refer to as the 
adjudicatory model and the contractarian model, inform the way 
courts perceive and respond to arbitration.  I will sketch each of the 
models in order to show how the contractarian model seems to better 
account for modern judicial attitudes toward arbitration. 
A.  The Adjudicatory Model 
There is a natural tendency, particularly among courts, to 
conceptualize arbitration as simply a private version of court 
adjudication.  The Supreme Court, in an 1855 decision, expressly 
equated arbitration with private adjudication, declaring that 
“[a]rbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters 
submitted to them, finally and without appeal.”149  Modern legal 
scholars often discuss arbitration in those terms as well.  In their 
seminal article Adjudication as a Private Good, William Landes and 
Richard Posner discuss arbitration as the primary modern example of 
private adjudication.150  They note that “[a]rbitrators typically apply 
the same rules as courts deciding similar questions” and go on to 
compare arbitration to adjudication as a way of assessing the 
efficiency of adjudication.151  It seems not to occur to them to 
understand arbitration as anything other than a substitute for formal, 
public adjudication. 
The distinctive feature of court adjudication is its focus on legal 
rights and obligations.  Courts find facts and then apply rules of law 
to determine those rights and obligations.  An observer who 
 
148 The first scholarly discussion of the two models of arbitration appeared in 1927, 
shortly after the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act opened the door to broad 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.  See Nathan Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial 
Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1927).  Lon Fuller suggested a similar dichotomy 
between arbitrators who act as private adjudicators and those who see themselves as 
conciliators unrestrained by procedural limitations.  See Lon L. Fuller, Collective 
Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3, 3-4. 
149 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855). 
150 See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 30 (arguing that private adjudication can 
provide a beneficial model for public adjudication). 
151 Id. at 249-53. 
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understands arbitration as a substitute for formal adjudication will 
expect the arbitrator to act like a judge in finding facts and applying 
rules of law.  This is an approach that the Supreme Court adopted 
during the early years of the FAA.152  Wilko is a good example.153 
The Court in Wilko refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate 
claims under the Securities Act of 1933.154  The Court dismissed 
arguments that an arbitrator could protect legal rights with the same 
competence as a court, but it did not take issue with the basic 
characterization of the arbitration process as a substitute for trial. 155  
It assumed that the arbitrators would function essentially as lower 
courts and simply rejected arbitration as an inadequate substitute.156  
Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent, made this understanding 
explicit, though he reached a different outcome as to the case’s 
arbitrability.157  Concluding that arbitration could effectively 
vindicate rights under the Securities Act, he described the FAA as 
impelled by “the advantages of providing a speedier, more 
economical and more effective enforcement of rights by way of 
arbitration than can be had by the tortuous course of litigation.”158 
When courts like the one in Wilko look at an arbitration, they see 
one or more aggrieved claimants demanding a decision as to which 
party is in the right and which is in the wrong.  They see facts to be 
determined and rules to be applied.  Their fundamental concern is 
with the arbitrator’s capacity to vindicate legal rights in a manner 
commensurate with a court’s. 
B.  The Contractarian Model 
As natural as the private adjudication model might seem, it is not 
the only way to conceptualize arbitration.  Arbitration may also be 
understood as a species of contract.  In the contractarian model, the 
arbitrator is not an adjudicator tasked with finding facts and applying 
generally applicable legal rules.  The arbitrator is instead the parties’ 
 
152 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
153 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
154 Id. at 436-37. 
155 See id. at 435-36. 
156 See id. at 437-38 (discussing and rejecting arbitration as an alternative “forum” for 
resolving the parties’ dispute). 
157 Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 439-40. 
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agent, tasked with interpreting their agreement once they reach an 
impasse.  The prominent labor scholar Theodore St. Antoine 
described the contractarian model in these terms: 
Put most simply, the arbitrator is the parties’ officially designated 
“reader” of the contract.  He (or she) is their joint alter ego for the 
purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to 
handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial 
agreement.  Thus, a “misinterpretation” or “gross mistake” by the 
arbitrator becomes a contradiction in terms.  In the absence of fraud 
or an overreaching of authority on the part of the arbitrator, he is 
speaking for the parties, and his award is their contract. . . . In sum, 
the arbitrator’s award should be treated as though it were a written 
stipulation by the parties setting forth their own definitive 
construction of the labor contract.159 
Again, in this model, the arbitrator does not act as a substitute 
judge.  The arbitrator is a surrogate for the parties, supplying the 
terms left out of their initial agreement.  The arbitrator’s focus is on 
giving efficacy to the parties’ agreement rather than on deciding who 
is right and who is wrong. 
The contractarian model has inspired arbitration’s proponents for 
many years.  Its first scholarly exegesis appeared in a 1927 article in 
the Harvard Law Review.160  The author contrasted the “legalistic 
view” of arbitration, which focuses on the arbitrator’s adjudicative 
role, with the “realistic view,” which understands the arbitrator as 
modifying the parties’ substantive relationship.161  He pointed out the 
tendency of businessmen to adopt the realistic view instead of the 
legalistic view favored by the courts.162  Consistent with that theme, 
Herbert Harley, then Secretary of the American Judicature Society, 
emphasized commercial arbitration’s focus on the relationship over 
the law in a 1916 Bulletin of the Society.  He noted that “[i]n the law 
the rendering of exact justice in the matter presented is a final aim.  
But in business the settlement of a given dispute is not the most 
important thing.  The big thing is the relationship between the 
parties.”163 
This understanding of arbitration’s role seems to have animated the 
FAA.  The FAA was the product of the ABA’s Committee on 
 
159 Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards:  A Second 
Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977). 
160 Isaacs, supra note 148. 
161 Id. at 929. 
162 Id. at 938. 
163 JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 18 (1918). 
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Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law.164  It was drafted by 
lawyers for businessmen who intended arbitration to be used to 
resolve disputes among businessmen.  Their focus was not on the 
adjudication of substantive rights, but on the resolution of day-to-day 
disputes that arise in the course of a commercial relationship.  The 
principal drafter and proponent, Julius Henry Cohen, described 
arbitration under the FAA in these terms: 
Not all questions arising out of contracts ought to be arbitrated.  It is 
a remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary 
disputes between merchants as to questions of fact—quantity, 
quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment, 
excuses for non-performance, and the like.  It has a place also in the 
determination of the simpler questions of law—the questions of law 
which arise out of these daily relations between merchants as to the 
passage of title, the existence of warranties, or the questions of law 
which are complementary to the questions of fact which we have 
just mentioned.  It is not the proper method for deciding points of 
law of major importance involving constitutional questions or 
policy in the application of statutes.165 
Cohen saw arbitration as a vehicle for resolving the routine 
disputes that arise between commercial trading partners as they 
perform their contractual obligations.  He never contemplated that 
arbitration would take the place of adjudication in the determination 
of substantive legal rights.  Although Cohen never expressly 
discussed these models, his understanding of arbitration seems much 
closer to the contractarian model than to the adjudicatory model.  His 
understanding is also consistent with the narrow grounds of judicial 
review allowed by the FAA.  If arbitrators are not acting in an 
adjudicatory capacity, then there is no need for courts to review their 
work in search of errors of law.166 
The Supreme Court implicitly adopted the contractarian model of 
arbitration, at least for labor cases, in United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.167  Enterprise Wheel involved the 
arbitration of a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement. 168  
 
164 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, 
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 41 (1992). 
165 Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. 
L. REV. 265, 281 (1926). 
166 See Ware, supra note 13, at 729-31.  “The entire FAA embodies a strongly 
contractual approach to arbitration law.”  Id. at 729. 
167 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
168 Id. at 595. 
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In the arbitration, the union represented several employees who had 
been fired for walking off the job.169  The arbitrator reinstated them 
and awarded back pay, even though the collective bargaining 
agreement had expired prior to the issuance of the award.170  The 
employer refused to comply with the award, arguing that it was 
unenforceable because the employees were no longer covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement.171  The union sought enforcement in 
the district court, which refused to upset the arbitrator’s award. 172  
The court of appeals, however, agreed with the employer that the 
arbitrator could not grant relief for the period after the expiration of 
the collective bargaining agreement and vacated that portion of the 
award.173 
The Supreme Court reversed on that issue, holding that the court 
had no power to review the merits of the award.  Its reasoning on that 
relatively uncontroversial point is significant: 
 The collective bargaining agreement could have provided that if 
any of the employees were wrongfully discharged, the remedy 
would be reinstatement and back pay up to the date they were 
returned to work.  Respondent’s major argument seems to be that by 
applying correct principles of law to the interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement it can be determined that the 
agreement did not so provide, and that therefore the arbitrator’s 
decision was not based upon the contract.  The acceptance of this 
view would require courts, even under the standard arbitration 
clause, to review the merits of every construction of the contract. . . 
. [T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s 
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s 
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no 
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract 
is different from his.174 
The Court treated the arbitrated issue not as a dispute calling for 
some form of adjudicatory decision, but as an aspect of the parties’ 
ongoing contractual relationship.  In keeping with the contractarian 
model, the Court focused on the terms of the agreement rather than on 
the determination of substantive legal rights. 
 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 595-96. 
174 Id. at 598-99. 
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Other recent cases, both in the Supreme Court and the circuit 
courts, seem also to have employed the contractarian model.  In 
Eastern Associated Coal,175 the Supreme Court refused to vacate an 
award reinstating a truck driver who twice tested positive for 
marijuana.176  The Court noted that the parties had “‘bargained for’ 
the ‘arbitrator’s construction’ of their agreement” and concluded that 
it had to “treat the arbitrator’s award as if it represented an agreement 
between [the employer] and the union as to the proper meaning” of 
the contract’s terms.177  The Court was echoing Judge Easterbrook, 
who, in a 1986 opinion emphasizing the limits of judicial review of 
arbitral awards, argued that “the [FAA] restricts the court to 
ascertaining that the arbitrator was a faithful agent of the contracting 
parties.”178 
These decisions all addressed labor disputes, and indeed the 
contractarian model seems most obviously applicable in labor and 
commercial cases.179  Moreover, while cases like Wilko invoke the 
adjudicatory model where arbitration of statutory rights is at issue, 
this approach to judicial review has been repudiated.180  The 
approach courts take to judicial review of arbitral awards today—not 
just in the labor or commercial contexts but in all cases—indicates an 
attitude toward arbitration that is more consistent with the 
contractarian model than the adjudicatory model.181  The deference 
courts pay to arbitrators goes far beyond the deference they pay to 
lower courts or even to administrative bodies.  Courts flatly say that 
 
175 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UMW Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000). 
176 Id. at 60-61. 
177 Id. at 61-62 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593, 599 (1960)). 
178 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Ind. Ass’n of E. Chicago, 
Inc., 790 F.2d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
179 In the Steelworkers trilogy, the Supreme Court distinguished between commercial 
arbitration, which it characterized as a substitute for litigation, and labor arbitration, which 
it characterized as a substitute for labor strife.  United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
180 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) 
(overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
181 Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and Commercial 
Arbitration:  An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 863 (2000) (“The 
Supreme Court now views the FAA as establishing a preemptive body of federal law 
strongly favoring the enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate.  It sees 
commercial arbitration ‘strictly as a matter of contract’ and considers the role of the courts 
to be one of simply giving effect to the intent of parties who agree to arbitrate future 
disputes.”) (citation omitted). 
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they will not vacate an arbitral award for legal or factual error even if 
the error is gross.182  Today, in practice, arbitrators in all cases are 
treated as agents of the parties rather than as deputized semipublic 
referees. 
The conceptual shift toward a contractarian model of arbitration is 
consistent with the trend toward what Judith Resnik has called 
“Contract Procedure.”183  Judges increasingly see their role as 
promoting and enforcing private contracts for the resolution of 
disputes rather than as ensuring that litigants receive due process.  
The move toward Contract Procedure appears in the encouragement 
of judicial participation in settlement negotiations,184 the growth of 
judicially sanctioned alternative dispute resolution,185 and the 
devolution of dispute resolution from courts to agencies.186  Its 
consequence is a new role for judges, whose job is no longer to decide 
cases but to manage a party-driven and largely unstructured 
bargaining process.  The contractarian model of arbitration is part and 
parcel of this broader shift.  Judges operating under the contractarian 
model do not see the arbitrator as a surrogate judge who must apply 
rules guaranteeing due process as a judge would.  Instead, the 
arbitrator is the parties’ representative who must be given free rein to 
formulate an effective pragmatic resolution. 
Neither the adjudicatory nor the contractarian model is “correct,” 
and I do not mean to suggest that courts presented with the choice 
would invariably subscribe to the contractarian model instead of the 
adjudicatory model.  The models simply provide alternative ways of 
thinking about arbitration; the same court may employ one model in 
one case and the other model in a different case.  My contention is 
that the contractarian model better explains the standard of review 
contained in the FAA and the usual behaviors of judges reviewing 
arbitral awards.  It also meshes better with larger trends in 
adjudicative procedure.  For these reasons, it provides a useful 
perspective from which to analyze and evaluate the relationship 
between arbitration and law. 
 
182 See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987). 
183 Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2005) 
(“While Procedure was once concerned about generating secondary rules by which to 
render judgment, today the task is to shape secondary rules for interpreting parties’ 
agreements . . . .”). 
184 See id. at 611-17. 
185 See id. at 619-21. 
186 See id. at 621-22. 
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III 
THE LAW OF CONTRACT AND THE WAIVER OF LEGAL RIGHTS 
THROUGH ARBITRATION 
Courts have the power to validate or invalidate arbitration and 
other ADR processes as alternatives both to formal adjudication and 
to law.  When courts enforce agreements to arbitrate, at a minimum 
they signal their acceptance of arbitration as an alternative to formal 
adjudicative process. 
Common-law courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements. 187  
They saw formal adjudicative process as such an essential right that 
they would not allow a party to prospectively waive the right to 
formal adjudication.  Today, courts are under explicit directions from 
the Supreme Court to enforce arbitration agreements.  The Supreme 
Court no longer sees the waiver of formal adjudicative process as the 
waiver of a fundamental right, and it has validated arbitration as an 
alternative in that sense.188  As a consequence, the Supreme Court has 
allowed arbitration to expand into every corner of the law.  As a 
practical matter, any dispute is arbitrableclaim is potentially subject to 
binding contractual arbitration, regardless of the legal rights and legal 
rules the disputeit implicates. 
That raises the question of the extent to which arbitration can serve 
as an alternative to law.  The Supreme Court has said unequivocally 
that statutory rules, especially those that create substantive rights, do 
apply in arbitration.  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,189 the case that opened the floodgates to arbitration, 
the Supreme Court expressly declared that parties do not forfeit 
statutory rights by agreeing to arbitrate:  “By agreeing to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather 
than a judicial, forum.”190  The Mitsubishi Court held antitrust claims 
 
187 See Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated 
Alabama’s Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 579-80 (1996) for a brief history 
of the common-law view of arbitration. 
188 As I suggested above, with respect to arbitration as an alternative to legal process, 
the only real limitation is cost.  A stronger party may not condition access to arbitration for 
a weaker party on the expenditure of costs that would be significantly greater than required 
for court adjudication.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 
(2000).  Beyond that, however, the process options are virtually unlimited. 
189 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
190 Id. at 628. 
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arbitrable.191  The Court later reiterated that principle in Rodriguez de 
Quijas,192 McMahon,193 and Gilmer,194 cases upholding arbitration 
of statutory claims under RICO, the federal securities laws, and the 
ADEA.  In theory, then, parties have a presumptive right to the 
enforcement of statutory rules in arbitration.  An arbitrator does not 
have the prerogative to disregard the statutory rights and liabilities 
that a judge would be obligated to take into account. 
In practice, however, the right to the application of statutory rights 
means little because of the deference courts give to arbitral awards. 195  
For instance, an award that would result in an illegal restraint of trade 
would be unenforceable under the narrow public policy ground 
enunciated in Eastern Associated Coal because it would direct the 
parties to violate the law.  That is an easy case because the law 
contravened by the award exists to protect the public.  Where the 
statutory rules at issue exist primarily to protect individual 
participants, however, courts almost never vacate even when an error 
of law is obvious.  For example, in DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc.,196 the arbitrators awarded plaintiff compensatory damages under 
the ADEA but refused to grant him attorneys’ fees even though the 
ADEA expressly mandates the award of attorneys’ fees to a 
successful plaintiff.197  The Second Circuit concluded that because 
the arbitrators did not know that attorneys’ fees were statutorily 
required, there was no manifest disregard of the law.198  It enforced 
the award.199 
DiRussa is an unusual case in two respects.  First, the arbitrators 
disclosed their failure to follow the law on the face of the award. 200  
Most arbitral awards do not contain explanations at all, and the ones 
that do typically do not make the errors appear so obvious.  For that 
reason, it is often impossible for a court to evaluate an award for legal 
error even if the court is so inclined.  Second, courts operate within a 
legal framework that discourages them from finding legal error, so 
 
191 Id. at 636-37. 
192 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). 
193 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987). 
194 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
195 See Ware, supra note 13, at 725. 
196 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997). 
197 Id. at 822. 
198 Id. at 822-23. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 823. 
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they tend to describe awards in terms that make the award sound 
rational.201  This tendency makes it very difficult to identify the 
reported decisions in which arbitrators made significant errors in 
applying legal rules. 
It is simply impossible to know the extent to which arbitrators 
misapply or fail to apply governing statutory rules in the great run of 
cases that never reach a judge or that do not contain errors made as 
apparent as the error in DiRussa.202  But we can assume that 
arbitrators frequently apply statutes in ways that appellate courts 
would conclude constitute reversible error.  The available empirical 
studies show that many arbitrators consciously choose to ignore legal 
rules at least some of the time.203  And we can assume based on the 
reversal rates for trial courts that those arbitrators who attempt to 
apply the law make relatively frequent mistakes. 
Take discrimination as an example.  While comprehensive data on 
reversal rates is not readily available, it appears that between twenty-
five and thirty percent of appeals in civil rights cases result in a 
reversal, a remand, or both.204  Even if many of these reversals are for 
procedural errors, trial judges must be making significant numbers of 
legal errors in applying federal civil rights statutes.  Arbitrators 
almost certainly are not better at applying statutes than trial judges.  
They must make reversible mistakes at least as often.205 
Given current standards of arbitral review, there is simply no 
assurance that statutory rules will be applied at all, much less applied 
in the way a judge would apply them.  As a practical matter, 
arbitration can be a vehicle for avoiding the law.  This is true whether 
the parties have equal bargaining power and knowingly choose to 
 
201 See, e.g., Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 269 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526 (D. Del. 2003).  The 
arbitrators in Parra refused to award prejudgment interest, apparently in contravention of 
governing Delaware law.  Id.  The court upheld the award, taking pains to paint the award 
as legally defensible:  “[C]redible arguments can be made that, under both Federal and 
Delaware law, prejudgment interest is not mandatory in all circumstances and the 
arbitrators could have viewed themselves, and apparently did view themselves, as free to 
exercise discretion in that regard.”  Id. 
202 A thorough empirical study might be able to determine this, but such a study is 
probably impossible given the confidentiality constraints that typically apply in arbitration. 
203 See Ware, supra note 13, at 719-20 (summarizing studies). 
204 These figures were generated through Westlaw searches of federal circuit court 
appeals raising issues under Title VII and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act and under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act for the ten years from 1995 through 2005. 
205 See, e.g., Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Arbitration provides neither the procedural protections nor the 
assurance of the proper application of substantive law offered by the judicial system.”). 
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forgo legal rights or whether one party agrees to a contract of 
adhesion with no real understanding of the rights he or she may be 
sacrificing.  In at least some cases, this use of arbitration to avoid law 
amounts to a prospective waiver of legal rights that basic rules of 
contract law proscribe. 
A.  The Prospective Waiver of Legal Rights Under Contract Law 
As the Supreme Court first began to free arbitration from the 
boundaries of collective bargaining agreements and commercial 
disputes, it expressed concern about the possible waiver of important 
legal rights.  That concern appears most prominently in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co.,206 in which the Court held that the submission 
of an employment discrimination claim to arbitration did not cut off 
the right to sue under Title VII.207  The Court concluded that “an 
employee’s rights under Title VII are not susceptible of [sic] 
prospective waiver.”208 
Since Gardner-Denver, the Court has changed its stance.  It now 
sees enforcing agreement terms as part of its job and the job of courts 
in general.  It has taken this to mean enforcing awards under virtually 
all circumstances as long as the arbitrator did not stray from the 
“essence” of the contract.  The only limitation the Court has imposed 
is the very narrow public policy ground that seems to apply only 
when the award would require a party to break the law. 
This approach is consistent with the Court’s adoption of a 
contractarian model of arbitration.  The Court equates enforcing an 
agreement with enforcing an award because it sees the arbitrator as 
the parties’ agent for interpreting the agreement.  Under this model, 
the arbitrator’s award is understood to be equivalent to a contract term 
agreed upon by the parties ex ante.  The plaintiff in DiRussa, for 
example, can be understood as having agreed to waive his statutorily 
prescribed right to attorneys’ fees in the event he proved that his 
employer discriminated against him.  By enforcing the award, the 
Court upheld that “bargain” despite the Supreme Court’s assurances 
that statutory rights should be protected in arbitration.  As a practical 
 
206 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
207 Id. at 56-57. 
208 Id. at 51-52. 
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matter, the Court allowed the parties to avoid the application of the 
law by contracting around it.209 
The lynchpin of this model is the parties’ assent.  Courts seem 
untroubled by the possibility that an arbitrator might misapply or fail 
to apply the law because that is what the parties agreed to.210  The 
problem with this approach is that it assumes far greater liberty of 
contract than actually exists.  Parties cannot contract to break the law.  
More importantly for arbitration purposes, though, is that parties often 
cannot contract to waive their own legal rights.  The law governing 
such “exculpatory contracts” has important ramifications for the law 
of arbitration that the courts have failed to recognize.211  These 
ramifications call into question the validity of arbitration as an 
alternative to law. 
Contractual agreements to shift risk go by many different labels, 
including waiver, release, and indemnification.212  I use the term 
exculpatory contract to cover any situation in which one party to a 
contract agrees to relieve another party of liability for harms resulting 
from the conduct of the latter.  Exculpatory contracts, in this sense, 
typically take the form of releases or waivers of rights or defenses. 
Traditionally, exculpatory contracts have been disfavored,213 and 
in certain situations they are per se unenforceable.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts states flatly that “[a] term exempting a party 
from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”214  The rule is not 
 
209 See Ware, supra note 13, at 726.  “When courts confirm arbitration awards that 
make errors of law, parties lose the substantive rights that would have been vindicated by 
an application of the law.”  Id. 
210 See Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in BRUNET ET AL., supra note 
22, at 3. 
211 It is important to note that the FAA does not preempt state law on exculpatory 
contracts.  The FAA preempts state law applying specifically to arbitration, but it does not 
preempt generally applicable state contract law.  See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 
(1987).  “[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law 
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
generally.  A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a 
contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of [9 U.S.C.] § 2.”  
Id. at 493 n.9. 
212 See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993), 
for helpful definitions of waiver, release, and indemnification. 
213 See, e.g., Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. 1989) 
(“Agreements attempting to exculpate a party from that party’s own negligence have long 
been disfavored.”) (citing Jones v. Walt Disney World Co., 409 F. Supp. 526, 528 
(W.D.N.Y. 1976); Harris v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ill. 1988)). 
214 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981). 
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limited to physical harms, so it would apply to agreements purporting 
to absolve a party from such intentional harms as discrimination and 
fraud.215  Exculpatory contracts are also unenforceable where they 
would relieve a seller from strict product liability.216 
Exculpatory contracts that relieve a party from liability for its own 
negligence are enforceable within limits.  One of those limits applies 
in the employment arena:  a contract may not relieve an employer 
from liability for its negligence that injures an employee.217  Another 
limit applies to common carriers, who may not exempt themselves 
from liability for their own negligence toward members of the public 
whom they serve.218 
Beyond those situations, courts typically evaluate a number of 
factors in deciding whether to enforce exculpatory contracts that 
relieve a party from its unintentional torts.  For example, the Colorado 
Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider: “(1) the 
existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service 
performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) 
whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and 
unambiguous language.”219  Other courts list different factors, but 
most seem to be looking for the same basic things.  They are reluctant 
to enforce exculpatory agreements where the party relieved of 
liability is performing a public service, where there is a serious 
disparity in bargaining power, or where the exculpatory term is 
ambiguous or hidden. 
The most important case addressing exculpatory contracts relating 
to public services is Tunkl v. Regents of the University of 
California.220  In Tunkl, the UCLA Medical Center required a patient 
to sign a release upon admission that relieved the hospital “from any 
and all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its 
 
215 See 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY 
TO PUBLIC POLICY § 88.8 (2003). 
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 214, § 195 cmt. c.  See 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14. 
217 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 214, § 195(2)(a). 
218 See id. § 195(2)(b) (explaining that a term exempting “one charged with a duty of 
public service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach 
of that duty” is unenforceable). 
219 Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (citing Rosen v. LTV Recreational 
Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978)); Barker v. Colo. Region- Sports Car Club, Inc., 
532 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 526 P.2d 676 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1974); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1961). 
220 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
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employees.”221  The patient’s wife sued the hospital, alleging that he 
died as a result of the malpractice of doctors employed by the 
hospital.222  The hospital sought to enforce the release of liability.223  
The California Supreme Court stated the rule that an exculpatory 
clause that affects the public interest is unenforceable.224  It identified 
a number of factors to consider in determining whether an activity is 
in the public interest, including the importance to the public of the 
service performed, whether the exculpated party holds itself out to the 
public, the economic setting of the transaction, and whether the 
injured party placed itself in the control of the exculpated party. 225  
The court concluded that the hospital was providing a public service 
and refused to enforce the release.226 
Unequal bargaining power used to be almost universally 
acknowledged as grounds for invalidating an exculpatory clause. 227  
One leading case was Miller’s Mutual Fire Insurance Association v. 
Parker,228 which addressed an attempt by a parking garage to limit its 
liability for its negligence when a car was stolen from the garage. 229  
The court refused to limit the garage owner’s liability.230  It found 
unequal bargaining power due to the fact that people wishing to park 
in that part of town frequently could not find parking on the street and 
had no choice but to use a parking garage.231 
 
221 Id. at 442. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 443. 
225 Id. at 445-46. 
226 Id. at 447.  Other courts have also held that the provision of medical treatment is a 
public service for which exculpatory clauses are unenforceable.  See, e.g., Leidy v. Deseret 
Enters., Inc., 381 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (practicing physical therapy); Olson v. 
Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977) (doctor performing an abortion). 
227 See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446 n.13.  In the law of unconscionability more generally, 
unequal bargaining power is often the key ingredient in a finding of procedural 
unconscionability.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 214, § 
208 cmt. d (“[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably 
favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved 
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no 
meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the 
unfair terms.”). 
228 65 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1951). 
229 Id. at 344. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
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Relying on that case and some earlier cases, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts stated that exculpatory clauses would not be 
enforced “where there is such disparity of bargaining power between 
the parties that the agreement does not represent a free choice on the 
part of the plaintiff.”232  The third Restatement, however, is more 
circumspect, saying only that “[w]hen an individual plaintiff 
passively accepts a contract drafted by the defendant, the contract is 
construed strictly, favoring reasonable interpretations against the 
defendant.”233  Following this approach, modern courts seem less 
inclined to categorically reject exculpatory contracts where the parties 
are of unequal power.234 
Even if it is not sufficient to invalidate an agreement, the risk of 
unequal bargaining power leads courts to scrutinize the language of 
exculpatory agreements.  Many require that a contract use the word 
“negligence” if it is to be construed as limiting liability for 
negligence.235  The New York Court of Appeals has held that “unless 
the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an 
exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from 
liability for his own negligent acts.”236  The Supreme Court of Texas 
has applied a broad “fair notice” requirement, which includes both a 
requirement that the agreement expressly disclaim liability for 
negligence and also a “conspicuousness requirement.”237  Other 
courts decline to require that the word “negligence” be used but 
demand a “clear and unequivocal” expression of mutual assent. 238  
The Restatement (Third) of Torts reiterates that test, noting that 
“[c]ourts normally construe exculpatory contracts strictly, finding that 
 
232 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. j (1965). 
233 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d 
(2000). 
234 See, e.g., Crandall v. Bangor Sav. Bank, No. CV-98-239, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 
304 at *5-6 (Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1999) (“The law in Maine appears to be that where 
contracts are presented on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis and the parties do not have equal 
bargaining power, the contract may be interpreted to meet the expectations of the party in 
the inferior bargaining position.”) (citation omitted). 
235 See, e.g., J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 552 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1977). 
236 Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) (citations omitted). 
237 Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993). 
238 Jig the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171, 177 n.7 
(5th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). 
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the plaintiff has assumed a risk only if the terms of the agreement are 
clear and unequivocal.”239 
In sum, courts are very reluctant to enforce contract terms that have 
the effect of prospectively waiving a party’s legal rights or defenses.  
They never enforce such exculpatory contracts when a party seeks to 
absolve itself of liability for its intentional torts.  They do enforce 
exculpatory contracts relieving liability for negligence, but not where 
the absolved party is performing a public service, as in the case of 
common carriers and providers of medical services, or where the 
parties are in an employer–employee relationship.  Finally, 
exculpatory agreements must always be manifested in clear, 
conspicuous, and unambiguous language. 
B.  Applying the Law of Exculpatory Contracts to              Arbitral 
Awards 
Courts’ uncritical acceptance of arbitral awards runs counter to the 
law governing exculpatory contracts generally.  Every time a court 
refuses to disturb an award that would be considered remedial legal 
error if issued by a judge, the court effectively sanctions the 
prospective waiver of a legal right.240  Under the law of contracts, 
those waivers should be enforced only in limited circumstances.  
However, courts confirm arbitral awards, many of which must be 
contrary to law, without regard to circumstances. 
The most problematic example of this tendency is the judicial 
acceptance of arbitration of intentional tort claims.  One area in which 
arbitration is most commonly used is for disputes between securities 
brokers and their customers.241  Many of these disputes involve 
claims for securities fraud, which is an intentional tort.  Under 
 
239 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 233, § 2, reporters’ note to cmt. d 
(citations omitted). 
240 Another way to understand the problem of waivers of rights in arbitration is through 
the distinction between mandatory and default legal rules.  Mandatory rules are rules that 
parties cannot contract around.  Default rules are rules that apply unless the parties specify 
some different rule.  See Ware, Interstate Arbitration, supra note 22, at 111.  There is no 
definitive list of mandatory legal rules.  In practice, the way a mandatory rule is identified 
is through a court’s refusal to enforce an exculpatory agreement waiving the rule’s 
application. Because the law of exculpatory contracts gives substance to the mandatory–
default distinction, I have chosen to focus on contract doctrine and to avoid generalizing 
using the mandatory–default labels. 
241 See generally Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation:  The Brave New 
World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095 (1993) (discussing securities 
arbitration generally). 
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standard contract doctrine, a contract exculpating a broker from 
liability for its fraud would be unenforceable.  The federal securities 
laws make that rule explicit.  Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 declare void any contract provision 
waiving compliance with any term of those acts.242  The Supreme 
Court relied on the former provision in Wilko to hold that fraud claims 
under the 1933 Act were not arbitrable.243 
First in McMahon, and then in Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court 
reversed itself and held arbitrable securities fraud claims arising under 
both Acts as well as under RICO.  It emphasized in both cases that the 
parties were not waiving their substantive rights under the statutes by 
presenting their cases in arbitration.244  But the Court has never faced 
up to the possibility of arbitral error in those cases.  If arbitrators fail 
to apply the law or misapply the law, and a court refuses to redress 
the error, parties will have waived compliance with the substantive 
terms of the statutes. 
The same problem arises with respect to employment 
discrimination, probably the most controversial growth area for 
arbitration.  Employment discrimination is an intentional tort.  A party 
must prove that there was a discriminatory motive for the injurious 
employment practice.245  The Supreme Court in Gilmer held that 
employment discrimination claims under the ADEA are arbitrable. 246  
Lower courts have extended arbitrability to discrimination claims 
under the civil rights laws and the Americans with Disabilities Act.247 
 
242 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (2000). 
243 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434 (1953), overruled by Rodiguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
244 See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482-83; Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) . 
245 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”). 
246 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
247 See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (enforcing the arbitration clause that required the parties to arbitrate claims 
under Title VII and the ADA); Sheth v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., No. 04 C 4280, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2457, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2005) (granting employer’s motion to compel 
arbitration when the employee alleged discrimination under Title VII); Valdes v. Swift 
Transp. Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 524, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting defendant’s motion to 
dismiss and ordering arbitration of plaintiff’s Title VII claims). 
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Again, however, the courts have dismissed the problem of arbitral 
error in these cases.  Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp.248 is a 
good example.  The plaintiff in Brown had filed a race discrimination 
claim with the EEOC.249  Prior to its resolution, he was 
terminated.250  He then filed suit in district court for discrimination 
and retaliation, but the district court compelled arbitration pursuant to 
an arbitration clause in his employment contract.251  The arbitrator 
subsequently denied him relief, and the plaintiff sought vacatur of the 
award on manifest disregard grounds, arguing that the arbitrator 
applied the wrong legal test in assessing his retaliation claim.252  Both 
the district court and the Eleventh Circuit upheld the award because 
the plaintiff had not shown that the arbitrator was conscious of the 
law and deliberately ignored it.  The Eleventh Circuit stated that 
“[e]ven if the arbitrator applied the wrong standard, which we need 
not decide, no manifest disregard for the law has been shown, and 
Brown’s argument fails.”253 
It is impossible to know whether the arbitrator in Brown properly 
applied the standard for retaliation or not, and that is the problem.  By 
declining to consider the possibility of legal error, the Eleventh 
Circuit gave that arbitrator and others the freedom to deviate from 
legal standards.  Some arbitrators, including perhaps the one in 
Brown, will take up that offer.  To the extent they fail to find 
discrimination where the law requires, they create a waiver of legal 
rights that would not be permissible if done by contract. 
Similar issues can arise in other common arbitration situations.  
Providers of medical services have begun to put arbitration clauses 
into the agreements that patients must sign upon admission. 254  
Courts have been reluctant to enforce those agreements.255  But they 
have left the door open to arbitration of medical malpractice claims as 
 
248 211 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2000). 
249 Id. at 1220. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 1220-21. 
252 Id. at 1223. 
253 Id. 
254 See Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much 
Ado About Nothing? 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 45, 51-52 (2000) (noting that while the 
“percentage of physicians using [arbitration] agreements was small, it was increasing”). 
255 See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 
(Ariz. 1992) (refusing to enforce an agreement requiring a patient to arbitrate her medical 
malpractice claim against her physician because the agreement appeared in a contract of 
adhesion and did not involve a conspicuous and explicit waiver of the right to a jury trial). 
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long as the agreement appeared to be voluntary and the arbitration 
panel was not biased.256  None of the cases has discussed the 
possibility of arbitral error.  Because the provision of medical care is 
a public service under contract law, an agreement to absolve a 
medical provider of its negligence would be unenforceable.  An 
arbitral award that erroneously failed to award damages for 
malpractice would have the same effect. 
Finally, arbitration is increasing in the consumer context. 257  
Financial institutions have been especially aggressive in putting 
arbitration clauses into their standard form contracts.258  These are 
classic contracts of adhesion.  The banks have much greater 
bargaining power than the customers and offer the contracts on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.  If these contracts contained provisions 
waiving the bank’s liability, they would be closely scrutinized by 
courts.259  And in fact courts do sometimes hold the arbitration 
clauses unenforceable when the clauses appear inordinately biased 
toward the bank.260  But courts frequently uphold those clauses, 261 
and again, they have not addressed the possibility of arbitral error. 
Because it provides no effective controls over arbitrators, the law 
of arbitration allows parties to avoid legal rules in ways that they are 
not permitted under contract law.  If the parties could not enter into a 
contract in which an employee agreed to forgo the right to be free 
from discrimination, to take one provocative example, then it makes 
no sense to uphold an “arbitral construction” of their agreement that 
produced the same result.  If anything, the arbitration case is worse, 
because the party cannot know at the time of contracting exactly what 
 
256 See Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 210-11 & n.45 (1996) (citing cases allowing arbitration of 
malpractice claims).  But see Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1016-17. 
257 See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004). 
258 See id. 
259 See, e.g., Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So. 2d 467, 469 (Miss. 1999) (stating that courts 
will subject exculpatory language to close judicial scrutiny) (citations omitted); Alack v. 
Vic Tanny Int’l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1996) (stating that future waivers 
of liability will be strictly construed against the party claiming the waiver).  See generally 
Ann Springer, Releases:  An Added Measure of Protection from Liability, 39 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 487 (1987) (explaining liability releases). 
260 See Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
261 See Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035 (S.D. 
Miss. 2000); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 926 (N.D. Tex. 2000). 
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rights it might be forfeiting.  The courts have simply failed to 
recognize this problem. 
IV 
PARTY AUTONOMY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:  IDENTIFYING THE 
ALTERNATIVE THE PARTIES BARGAINED FOR 
Taken to its logical conclusion, my contract law argument entails a 
heightened standard of review for any arbitral award raising the sorts 
of issues implicated by the law of exculpatory contracts.  Certainly 
the simplest way to address the potential for improper avoidance of 
legal rules through arbitration is to require de novo judicial review of 
all mandatory legal rules raised in arbitration.  A number of scholars 
concerned about the loss of due process entailed by binding 
arbitration of public law disputes have argued for that result.  In his 
critique of the privatization of law through arbitration, Professor 
Stephen Ware argued that courts must either refuse to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate disputes implicating mandatory legal rules or 
require de novo review of awards in those cases.262  Other 
commentators have suggested applying standards of review that fall 
between the current policy of complete deference and a de novo 
standard.  A typical example would require vacatur if an award 
“egregiously departs from established legal principles.”263 
Despite its logical appeal, the solution of heightening standards of 
review across the board—either to a de novo or some lesser 
standard—is neither practicable nor desirable.  It is impracticable 
because of courts’ overwhelming embrace of unreviewable 
arbitration.  To this point, courts have shown little interest in 
expanding their oversight role with respect to arbitration.  While a 
limited increase in judicial review may be feasible, a dramatic and 
broad increase is not.  And even if courts were willing to take on a 
greater oversight role, an across-the-board increase in judicial review 
would not be desirable because it would unnecessarily constrict party 
autonomy in the selection of dispute resolution processes. 
Although we say that parties cannot agree to avoid the operation of 
mandatory legal rules, in fact, they do so routinely.  That is precisely 
what settlement entails.  Adjudication is, in most instances, a zero-
sum game.  Courts resolve disputes by finding that the parties either 
 
262 See Ware, supra note 13, at 704. 
263 Poser, supra note 130, at 473. 
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did or did not violate their legal duties.264  When parties settle 
lawsuits, they agree to avoid those determinations.  They agree, in 
other words, to an outcome different from the one that would be 
produced by the application of legal rules through adjudication.265  
Only in rare cases do courts scrutinize settlements, even when the 
claims involve mandatory legal rules. 266  Every time they settle a 
claim involving mandatory legal rules in a way that does not match 
the adjudicative outcome that would have resulted, the parties have 
agreed to avoid the law. 
We seem to be comfortable with those outcomes for several 
reasons.  Settlements come after legal rights have matured.  At that 
point in the process, we assume that the parties have full information 
regarding the rights they might be forgoing.267  Furthermore, we 
assume that the structure of the system—particularly the availability 
of contingency fee arrangements—ensures a relatively level playing 
field on which the parties can negotiate.268  The agreement to avoid 
the operation of legal rules has relatively strong indicia of 
voluntariness.  Parties can sometimes be bludgeoned into settlement 
of meritorious claims by threats of protracted and expensive 
 
264 For a general critique of this feature of adjudication, see John E. Coons, Approaches 
to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 750 
(1964). 
265 This is true even when the parties consciously construct settlement parameters based 
on the likely adjudicative outcome.  In setting reservation prices for use in negotiating a 
settlement, the parties derive an expected value for the case by multiplying the expected 
recovery by the likelihood of achieving that recovery.  See Russell Korobkin, A Positive 
Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1792-93 (2000).  That expected value is 
not the actual expected recovery in that case.  It is, instead, the average recovery that could 
be expected if the case were litigated many times.  See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, 
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 46 (2002).  However, it probably does not reflect 
the real consequences of application of the salient legal rules in any one case. 
266 See, e.g., Antitrust Penalties & Procedures Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2000) 
(requiring a judge to decide whether antitrust settlements proposed by the United States 
are “in the public interest”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) (requiring court approval for 
settlement of class actions). 
267 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:  A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2677 (1995) 
(“Even those settlements that actively and intentionally seem to depart from the law are 
accomplished precisely because a potential legal result has been considered (and is, thus, 
still a reference point) and has been rejected.”). 
268 But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076-77 (1984).  Fiss 
argues that power imbalances often result in coerced settlements.  Id.  The availability of 
contingent fees does not fully rectify those imbalances because contingent fees are 
available only to plaintiffs and only in certain types of cases.  Id. at 1077. 
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litigation.269  But the availability of contingency fees and the default 
rule requiring each party to pay its own attorneys’ fees reduce 
concerns about coerced settlements. 
It is a very different thing for parties to agree prospectively—
before their rights have accrued—to forgo legal rights.  The parties 
lack complete information at that point, and the potential for power 
imbalances may make the waiver of rights only nominally voluntary.  
Thus, for example, parties cannot agree prior to the accrual of a cause 
of action to extend a statute of limitations, but they can agree to 
extend the limitations period after the cause of action has accrued.270 
Arbitration presents a case somewhere between the extremes of 
settlement on the one hand and explicit prospective waiver of rights 
on the other.  My premise that parties may be understood to have 
agreed ex ante on the terms of the award ultimately rendered by the 
arbitrator is a fiction.  In fact, the parties undoubtedly go into the 
arbitration hoping for a favorable decision, and many times they get 
it.  When they agree to arbitrate, they do not agree to forgo their 
rights.  Instead they agree to accept the chance that they will forgo 
their rights.  This choice is problematic, but it is less problematic than 
an express waiver of rights in an exculpatory agreement would be. 
Concerns about the waiver of legal rights through arbitration can 
be addressed with a relatively modest change in judicial approach to 
confirmation of awards.  First, the cases on exculpatory contracts 
offer guidance as to the kinds of cases in which the prospective 
waiver of legal rights raises sufficient concerns to warrant a 
heightened standard of review.  Waivers that amount to consent to an 
intentional injury, involve the provision of public services, or occur 
between parties with dramatically different bargaining power raise 
special concerns.  On the other hand, where these factors are not 
present, waivers of legal rights may promote social goals including 
efficiency and conservation of judicial resources. 
Further, the Supreme Court’s arbitration cases suggest a division 
between statutory rules on the one hand, and procedural and common-
law rules on the other.  In discussing the requirement that arbitrators 
apply legal rules, the Court has focused entirely on statutory 
commands, such as those contained in the securities laws, the antitrust 
 
269 See id. at 1075. 
270 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 201 (McKinney 2005) (“An action . . . must be commenced 
within the time specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by law or a 
shorter time is prescribed by written agreement.”) (emphasis added). 
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laws, the discrimination laws, and RICO.  It has never admonished 
arbitrators to follow procedural or common-law rules in the same 
way. 
Statutory rights have, correspondingly, become a focal point for 
scholars calling for greater judicial scrutiny of awards.271  While a 
focus on statutory rights may come at a cost in analytic principle,272 it 
simplifies the process of determining when additional judicial review 
is warranted and narrows the range of cases in which that review will 
occur.273  A proposal that targets only statutory rights thus has a 
better chance of acceptance and implementation than one that 
addresses mandatory rules more generally.  For that reason, I suggest 
that arbitral awards implicating procedural and common-law rules 
should receive little or no additional scrutiny, while those implicating 
statutory rules merit greater solicitude. 
These principles suggest a flexible approach to the problem of law 
avoidance through arbitration.  Rather than adopting a heightened 
standard of review in all cases, courts need to treat cases differently 
depending first on the legal rules involved, and then on the 
relationship of the parties and the nature of their dispute.  Only cases 
implicating statutory rules of the kind disfavored in the law governing 
exculpatory contracts warrant any additional judicial review.  Where 
those important statutory rights are at issue and the parties have 
entered into an agreement to arbitrate, I propose a three-level 
approach to judicial review.  The approach turns on whether the 
parties are of equal or unequal bargaining power and whether the 
 
271 See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 157, 210 (1989).  
Professor Speidel argues that courts should not be precluded from reviewing an 
arbitrator’s decision determining federal statutory rights.  Id.  However, he would preclude 
review when it can be shown that the arbitral procedures were substantially similar to 
those used in litigation, and the arbitrator actually decided the facts and the legal 
questions.  Id. 
272 See Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach 
to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1076 (1987).  “It is evident that 
there is no necessary distinction between the substance of common law and statutory 
provisions.”  Id. 
273 Cf. Ware, supra note 13, at 732-33.  Professor Ware argues that the proper 
distinction is between mandatory and default rules.  Id.  In other words, he would apply a 
heightened standard of review to any rules—whether statutory or common-law—that are 
not waivable under the law of contract.  See id.  His position has logical appeal.  I have not 
adopted it for reasons that are purely pragmatic:  I believe the proposal that has the best 
chance for adoption is the one that calls for the least change from the status quo. 
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circumstances suggest the existence of an ongoing relationship. 274  
Using these factors, I place arbitrations in three categories:  (1) those 
in which the parties have roughly equal bargaining power and are in 
an ongoing relationship, (2) those in which the parties have roughly 
equal bargaining power but no ongoing relationship, and (3) those in 
which the parties have substantially unequal bargaining power. 
My objective in categorizing arbitrations this way is to find criteria 
that can serve as useful indicators of party intent.  We can assume 
parties choose arbitration at least because they desire an alternative to 
formal adjudicative process.  The question then becomes the extent to 
which the parties seek, voluntarily and with full information, an 
alternative to law.  I will suggest different standards of review that 
should presumptively apply to the arbitrations in these classes. 
For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the parties have 
substantially disparate bargaining power whenever one side has no 
meaningful opportunity to influence the terms of the agreement.  
Given this definition, unequal bargaining power would exist with 
respect to all contracts of adhesion, including consumer contracts 
relating to everything from computer equipment to financial services 
to medical care.  It would also exist with respect to any employment 
contract in which the employee has insufficient leverage to materially 
affect the terms of the agreement. 
I measure the existence of an ongoing relationship as of the time of 
the arbitration rather than the time of contracting.  If the parties 
contemplated an ongoing relationship in the contract, but the 
relationship has soured past the point of reconciliation, then creative 
remedies an arbitrator might otherwise attempt to find become 
extraneous.  The contract is, in effect, modified, and the arbitrator 
should take that fact into account. 
A.  Equal Bargaining Power, Ongoing Relationship 
Formal adjudication is by its nature a combative enterprise.  
Success depends on proving that the other side either did something 
wrong or is wrong in alleging that it suffered a remediable harm.  A 
certain amount of bitterness is almost certain to result from such a 
 
274 See Hugh Baxter, Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 50 BUFF. 
L. REV. 205, 278 (2002) (“The parallel in the bargaining situation is that the parties must 
have ‘equal opportunity for pressure,’ that is, equal bargaining power.”).  See generally 
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005) 
(discussing bargaining power and the effects of unequal bargaining power).  
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contest.  For that reason, people who have an interest in maintaining a 
relationship have especially powerful reasons for seeking alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration. 
Parties in that situation normally will want more than just an 
alternative to formal adjudicative processes.  They will also want an 
alternative to the application of legal rules, because legal rules tend to 
provide binary solutions.  Rather than hoping for a finding that a 
contracting partner committed fraud, for instance, parties to these 
disputes often want a restructuring of their relationship that will 
produce mutual benefits.  When their negotiations break down, they 
want a neutral to supply the terms that they should have agreed to—
whether or not those terms would be the ones the law would require.  
As long as the parties have roughly equivalent bargaining power, 
there is no good reason to bar parties in this situation from avoiding 
law through arbitration. 
The two contexts in which arbitration has historically thrived 
most—commercial disputes and labor–management relations—fit this 
paradigm.  In both contexts, most of the time the parties bring 
bargaining power to the table and anticipate further interaction.  They 
have reason to minimize conflict even if that means forgoing certain 
legal rights to which they might be entitled. 
Not coincidentally, this situation—parties with equal bargaining 
power in an ongoing relationship—seems to be the one that best fits 
within the statutory structure of the FAA.  Where it is appropriate for 
the parties to avoid law, the only review required under the FAA is 
what is necessary to make sure that the arbitrator does not exceed his 
authority, possess bias, or direct the parties to do something illegal. 275  
If arbitration were limited to commercial disputes and labor–
management relations, this level of review would be entirely 
appropriate.  But it is not.  As arbitration has expanded, the parties to 
arbitration agreements may lack either or both equal bargaining 
power and an ongoing relationship. 
B.  Equal Bargaining Power, No Ongoing Relationship 
Frequently parties with equal bargaining power will choose 
arbitration in the absence of an ongoing relationship.  Commercial 
disputes fall into this class where the parties have a finite agreement 
or where the relationship has irreparably deteriorated.  Large investors 
 
275 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. II 2001-2003). 
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and their securities brokers may also find themselves in this situation, 
as may powerful employees and their employers. 
In these cases, there is reason to think that the parties selected 
arbitration voluntarily and with full information.  To that extent, it 
makes sense to treat the arbitrator’s award as a manifestation of the 
parties’ mutual intent.  This class is different from the first class, 
however, because the parties have less incentive to avoid the 
adversarialism of adjudication.  Without the lure of benefits from 
future dealings, the parties will frequently want a declaration of their 
rights and obligations, and they may expect the arbitrator to provide 
one.  At least some of the time, the parties will see the outcome of the 
arbitration as a win for one and a loss for the other.  To that extent, it 
makes less sense to treat the award as a manifestation of the parties’ 
mutual intent. 
Still, if arbitrations falling in the first class call for the minimum in 
judicial review, arbitrations in this class call for only slightly more.  
One important reason why parties have traditionally selected 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is that they want a 
decision maker who will apply industry standards instead of legal 
rules.  Among merchants, for example, certain disputes are resolved 
almost exclusively with arbitrators who apply customary standards 
rather than legal rules.276  In many cases, these disputants want a 
decision maker to determine who is right and who is wrong, but they 
do not want that decision to be made by reference to legal rules. 
For these arbitrations, the manifest disregard test should 
supplement the “essence” test and the public policy ground as an 
additional standard of judicial review.  Under the manifest disregard 
test, as it is most commonly understood, an award may be disturbed 
only if the arbitrator acknowledges a legal rule and then ignores it. 277  
Where parties have roughly equal bargaining power, it makes sense to 
assume that they voluntarily and knowingly entrust their dispute to 
the arbitrator.  If the arbitrator chooses not to decide the dispute by 
reference to generally applicable legal rules, the parties may be 
understood to acquiesce in that choice.  On the other hand, if the 
arbitrator chooses to apply legal rules, the parties may be understood 
to demand that he or she actually apply them.  In such a case, the 
 
276 See William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York:  
A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 218-19. 
277 See Poser, supra note 130, at 504-05. 
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manifest disregard of the legal rules would contravene the parties’ 
intentions. 
C.  Unequal Bargaining Power 
Increasingly, arbitration clauses appear in agreements between 
parties with dramatically different bargaining power, whether or not 
they are engaged in an ongoing relationship.278  This class includes 
most consumer arbitrations, including most securities arbitrations, and 
a great many employer–employee arbitrations.  These are the cases in 
which the contractarian model of arbitration is least apposite.  Almost 
by definition, the parties have different interests, so the “agent” of one 
cannot simultaneously be the “agent” of the other, as the contractarian 
model assumes. 
The courts have moved far beyond the point at which the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements in these situations is open to 
serious question.  The Supreme Court is firmly committed to 
arbitration as an alternative to formal adjudication.  It has refused to 
entertain arguments that arbitration is an inadequate substitute even 
for contracts of adhesion.279  As a matter of arbitration doctrine, an 
agreement to arbitrate amounts to a statement of the parties’ intention 
to avoid formal adjudication. 
But the agreement to forgo formal adjudication does not 
necessarily entail an agreement to forgo the application of legal rules.  
This is the point at which the prevailing model of judicial review 
breaks down.  In cases in which the parties to an agreement to 
arbitrate have significantly disparate bargaining power, a presumption 
should apply that the parties desire some minimal level of substantive 
judicial review to protect against clear errors of law. 
The question, of course, is what level of review to apply.  Giving 
courts the power to review the legal decisions of arbitrators de 
novo—as appellate courts review trial judges’ decisions on legal 
issues—would effectively defeat arbitration as an effective alternative 
to formal adjudication.  Any party disappointed with the award could 
subject the other party to the equivalent of a formal appeal in virtually 
any case.  This result could, in the end, hurt the weaker party more 
 
278 Where there is such a disparity of bargaining power, the stronger party will have the 
ability to dictate the terms of the agreement, including the possibility of extending the 
relationship.  Thus, the contemplation of an ongoing relationship cannot be assumed to be 
voluntary and mutually intended. 
279 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
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than the stronger.  Some studies have shown that arbitration is good 
for employees with discrimination claims, for example, because its 
low cost allows the pursuit of smaller or more speculative claims that 
no plaintiff’s lawyer operating on a contingency fee would pursue in 
court.280  That advantage could be lost if every employee who won in 
arbitration faced the prospect of a further round of litigation in court. 
But some lower standard of review could ensure basic compliance 
with legal rules while retaining the effectiveness of arbitration.  
Several other lower standards would suffice.  For example, trial 
judges review the decisions of juries by asking whether a reasonable 
jury could decide the way the jury decided.281  Appellate courts 
review the factual determinations of trial judges by asking whether 
the judge abused his or her discretion.282  Courts review the 
determinations of administrative agencies by asking whether the 
agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious.283  It is not clear what 
difference, if any, there is among these standards.  Each requires 
deference to the lower decision maker, and each applies some version 
of a test of rationality.  Any of the three could be adopted, as could an 
explicit rationality standard.  The exact wording of the test is not 
especially significant as long as the court has the power to correct 
clear and important errors of law. 
Implicit in this discussion is the principle that the arbitrator’s 
factual findings should be free from judicial review outside of the 
traditional grounds.  The arbitrator’s factual findings provide the 
background for his or her decision on the parties’ rights and 
responsibilities.  Under a contractarian model, those findings are the 
equivalent of the recitals in a contract.  Contract law prevents parties 
from bargaining away certain legal rights in certain circumstances.  It 
says nothing about the factual premises on which the parties base 
their agreements. 
 
280 See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 
563-64 (2001). 
281 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.4 (4th ed. 2005) 
(describing the nature and scope of review). 
282 Id. 
283 See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 & n.23 (1989) (stating 
that the applicable standard of review for administrative agency determinations is the 
arbitrary and capricious standard); Neiman v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
722 F. Supp. 954, 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (reviewing the administrative agency’s 
determination under the arbitrary and capricious standard). 
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Even though courts have no reason to review the arbitrator’s 
factual findings, my proposal would require arbitrators to 
memorialize their factual findings and legal conclusions in order to 
allow for meaningful judicial review of the legal issues.  There seems 
to be a trend in this direction anyway,284 but it represents a change 
from traditional practice, in which arbitrators were expressly 
encouraged not to create a reviewable record.285  From my 
perspective, this change would be a positive one.  The requirement of 
writing a reasoned opinion has long served as an important guarantor 
of adjudicative fairness.  Where arbitrators are called on to decide the 
sorts of statutory issues traditionally reserved for courts, and the 
parties’ relationship indicates an intention to apply legal rules to the 
dispute, the arbitrators should provide reasons for their decisions. 
The heightened standard of review I propose should apply 
regardless of the terms purportedly agreed upon in the arbitration 
clause.  Again, my argument is that the parties should not be 
permitted to prospectively waive their rights to the application of 
statutory rules in these cases.  That is, they should not be able to 
contract away judicial review even if they attempt to do so expressly 
in the agreement. 
On the other hand, once the rights in question have matured and the 
parties have reached the point of arbitration, the waiver calculus 
changes.  A waiver of rights after a legal cause of action has matured 
is simply a settlement.  If the parties mutually decide to give an 
arbitrator the freedom to disregard the law at that point—or if they 
simply want to guarantee that their dispute will not reach a court—
their wishes should be honored unless a settlement in similar 
circumstances would be disallowed.286  The heightened standard of 
 
284 See Covington, supra note 13, at 394-95 (citing various recommendations for 
written opinions in at least some types of arbitrations).  See also Christopher B. 
Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators Should Be 
Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 285, 287 
(2000) (arguing for written, publicly available opinions in cases involving issues of public 
law). 
285 See American Arbitration Ass’n Guide for Commercial Arbitrators (2006),  
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22016.  The AAA Guide makes clear that arbitrators are not 
required to provide written opinions, emphasizing that “a carelessly expressed thought in a 
written opinion could afford an opportunity to delay enforcement of the award.  The 
obligations to the parties are better fulfilled when the award leaves no room for attack.”  
Id. 
286 Cf. Ware, supra note 13, at 728-29.  Professor Ware argues for de novo review of 
awards implicating mandatory legal rules but not for postdispute agreements to arbitrate.  
See also Ware, Interstate Arbitration, supra note 22, at 111. 
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review, then, should apply presumptively only.  Courts should assume 
that they have an obligation to review arbitral determinations on 
statutory rules of law for irrationality (or some comparable standard) 
unless the parties expressly agree to a different standard after their 
dispute reaches the point of arbitration. 
That raises the question of whether parties can dictate terms of 
review to courts.  There is no clear consensus on this issue.  Several 
circuits, most prominently the Ninth Circuit in Kyocera Corp. v. 
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.,287 have held that parties may 
not contract for judicial review beyond that contained in section 10 of 
the FAA.288  Other circuits, including the Fourth and Fifth, allow the 
parties to contract for additional review.289  All the cases raising this 
issue involve attempts by parties to heighten the review that a court 
would otherwise provide.  My proposal does not necessarily implicate 
those cases.  I am arguing that review for irrationality or arbitrariness 
should be part of courts’ residual common-law authority over 
arbitration.  If parties want a degree of review more exacting, then 
they run into the Kyocera line of cases.290  But my primary concern is 
that parties have the freedom to avoid judicial review if they so 
desire.  Just as parties are normally free to opt out of litigation by 
choosing arbitration in the first instance, so they should be free to opt 
out of judicial review of arbitral awards as long as they do so after the 
legal rights in question have matured.291 
 
287 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
288 See also Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 940 (10th Cir. 2001).  The 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits have suggested in dicta that parties should not be entitled to 
contract for heightened review.  See UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 
992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998); Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, 
Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). 
289 See Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 592-93 (5th Cir. 2001); Syncor 
Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *17 (4th Cir. 
Aug. 11, 1997). 
290 See generally Jonathan R. Bunch, Arbitration Clauses Should Be Enforced 
According to Their Terms—Except When They Shouldn’t Be:  The Ninth Circuit Limits 
Parties’ Ability to Contract for Standards of Review of Arbitration Awards, 2004 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 461 (discussing conflicting case law on parties’ right to contract for higher 
standard of review than provided in FAA). 
291 There is a fundamental difference between contracting for judicial review and 
contracting to avoid judicial review.  Parties cannot contract to give courts power to hear 
claims that are beyond the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Chicago 
Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1505 (“[Parties] cannot contract for judicial review of [an 
arbitral] award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.”).  But they are 
normally free to waive their rights to adjudicative process.  For example, parties can forgo 
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CONCLUSION 
The argument I have made in this Article rests on a particular way 
of conceptualizing arbitration.  I take a model that sees the arbitrator 
as the parties’ agent for interpreting their agreement, what I call the 
contractarian model, and tease out the implications that follow from a 
rigorous application of that model.  I assume that the arbitrator’s 
award may be understood as equivalent to a contract term agreed 
upon by the parties ex ante.  I then argue that if the award would be 
unenforceable as an exculpatory contract if its terms were included in 
the agreement, it does not deserve the extreme judicial deference 
normally applied.  I suggest that a presumptively higher, although still 
quite deferential, standard of review should apply when an arbitration 
involves parties whose relationship raises concerns about the 
prospective waiver of legal rights. 
The contractarian model is merely one way of conceptualizing 
arbitration.  For an observer who sees arbitration simply as private 
adjudication, the model loses force and so does my argument.  I have 
explained why I believe the contractarian model is a valid and useful 
way of understanding arbitration.  But I want to emphasize that I 
believe the adoption of a private adjudication model would raise even 
more fundamental concerns.  This is an argument convincingly made 
by Richard Rueben, who has contended that arbitration, in at least 
some cases, is an aspect of public justice to which due process rights 
must apply.292  My objective, in part, is to demonstrate that these 
concerns do not disappear if arbitration is conceptualized as a species 
of contract rather than adjudication. 
Understandable frustration with high litigation costs, crowded 
court dockets, and unpredictable juries has led to the judicial embrace 
of essentially unreviewable arbitration.  The change in judicial 
attitudes and the corresponding expansion of arbitration have 
 
jurisdiction in a particular court by agreeing to a forum selection clause.  See 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 281, § 3.5. 
292 See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:  Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 609-41 (1997).  Moreover, other commentators 
have made similar arguments without expressly equating arbitration with adjudication.  
See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference 
for Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and 
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997).  But see MedValUSA Health 
Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 428 (Conn. 2005) (holding that a 
judicially confirmed arbitration award granting punitive damages is exempt from due 
process limits because judicial confirmation is not a state action). 
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occurred very rapidly.  As a result, the full implications of the 
arbitration-based dispute resolution system have not been explored.  
This Article points out one significant way in which the modern law 
of arbitration clashes with bedrock principles of contract law.  It 
cannot and does not pretend to answer the many policy questions 
raised by the growth of arbitration.  But it provides a concrete 
doctrinal reason why courts need to be more active in their scrutiny of 
arbitral awards than they have become accustomed to. 
 
 
